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**Latin American disengagement from the United States secular
trends of increased autonomy, 1948–1983**

Pinal-Calvillo, Sylvia Adriana, Ph.D.

The University of Arizona, 1994

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LATIN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES
SECULAR TRENDS OF INCREASED AUTONOMY
1948-1983

by
Sylvia Adriana Pinal-Calvillo

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
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In the Graduate College
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
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
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ABSTRACT

Two major goals guide this work: first, to empirically describe patterns of secular Latin American behavior in their foreign policy vis a vis the United States; second, to theoretically explain such patterns. Trends of foreign policy behavior in three dimensions: economic, political and diplomatic, were studied for twenty Latin American nations during 36 years. Pooled time-series cross-section statistical analysis was utilized for explanatory purposes.

Results suggest empirical evidence to accept that the Latin American political, economic and diplomatic foreign policy behavior towards the US shows a sustained tendency towards disengagement (or increased distancing) for the 1948-83 period. Economic disengagement seems to precede political disengagement. Economic disengagement is recorded in nineteen out of twenty countries in the study, while political disengagement occurs in all twenty. Diplomatic disengagement is recorded in thirteen out of the twenty countries included.

Six models, each representing a different theoretical approach, were tested to determine which of them best explains the occurrence of foreign policy disengagement in Latin America: 1) Declining hegemony; 2) Dependency; 3) National Capabilities; 4) World Systems; 5) Integrative model; 6) Interaction effects model. Model 6 proved to have the highest statistical significance.

Geographic location and the relative position in the world system are the two sets of variables that best explain foreign policy distancing from the hegemon. Geographic closeness to the US is associated with countries showing greater verbal (political) autonomy in the UN, while engaging in greater levels of convergence in their diplomatic behavior vis a vis the US. Economic disengagement is best explained by the relative position of countries in the World System. Opposite from what is predicted by the theory, as countries move upwardly in the system, they tend to build greater levels of economic convergence with the US as they share common economic interests.

INTRODUCTION

The world has witnessed a series of unexpected dramatic changes during the early 1990s. The Berlin Wall was knocked down, Germany unified, the Eastern Bloc dismantled, the Soviet Union disappeared, peace was signed for El Salvador, and is being negotiated for the Middle East. The map of the world is being renegotiated as this introduction is written. In essence, a great deal of what we took for granted in international politics has changed. There is not much left of the loose bipolar world in which we used to live not long ago.

At present, the last leftovers of the post World War II bipolarity disappeared as one of its poles vanished. Much attention has been paid to this phenomenon that, now, appears to be a clear result of the unsuccessful economic performance of an economic system that was doomed to fail.

We certainly live in the midst of enormous uncertainty. We know that socialism did not work for the Eastern Bloc, but we do not know what will work. We know that it will take a long time to reorganize those societies in a more efficient way but we do not know how long is a long time. We know that they will need resources and guidance from the West, but we do not know exactly what does that entail.

On the other hand, the West is also going through major transformations. The European Community is integrating itself into a unified political entity --potentially strong enough to replace the United States as a world leader. Major renegotiations are taking place within the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to prevent a commercial war. The United States is going through a severe recession whose length is not yet predictable; and neither are its consequences. Major debates are taking place within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to decide who is going to sponsor the rebuilding of Eastern economies and who, in the developing world, is going to be sacrificed in order to do it. This is particularly important since it is to be expected that financial resources previously assigned to developing countries are going to be deviated to rebuild "Eastern" societies. This is a fact that will have important consequences in terms of leadership and international political clientele.

The previous paragraphs briefly summarize the picture of the contemporary world. We know where we are, but we know little of how we ended up there. The events that we witness occurring now in the Eastern Bloc are the product of a long lasting process that finally led to the breakdown of the system. Nevertheless, processes of deterioration of leadership are not exclusive to the Eastern Bloc. The fact

that we witness the deterioration of one of the poles of power of the bipolar world in no way guarantees the inner strength of the remaining pole. The acknowledgement of the failure of the Soviet leadership in the East says nothing about the American leadership in the West.

Scholars in the international relations field have been writing about cycles of hegemony and the present state of the system which, some of them argue, is currently undergoing the decline of American hegemony. According to such literature not only the Soviet leadership was going through a process of decline in its own sphere of influence during the last decade, at least, but the United States was going through its own in a parallel manner. There is no consensus, however, about such a point. There is no consensus either on the interpretation of the possible effects that such a phenomenon may have on the political dynamics of the international system. One of the purposes of this work is to contribute with empirical analysis to the understanding of this phenomenon concentrating on its potential effects in the Latin American region.

CHAPTER 1

LATIN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES

1.1. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First it is intended to uncover patterns of Latin American foreign policy disengagement from the United States during the 1948-1983 period. Second, an attempt is made to contribute to the explanation of such a phenomenon. For this reason a series of explanatory models, that reflect hypotheses based on different theories, are empirically tested and compared. The first of such models addresses the possible links between Latin American foreign policy disengagement and the decline of American hegemony. The second is based on the arguments presented by the dependency approach. The third reflects the national attributes theory (also called the modernization approach by some). The fourth tests the main argument presented by the World Systems theory. Finally, an integrative explanation --that links together the previous four views-- is presented as a more powerful explanatory possibility.

Decline of hegemony is conceived as a long term, evolutionary process whose trends can be traced before the system collapses. Therefore, it becomes relevant to study the issue before the hegemonic cycle is completed. One of the puzzles addressed by this research attempts to figure out whether the loss of hegemonic control over the periphery would be a significant sign of hegemonic decline. Intuitively, one can expect that, when a hegemon loses control over the weakest partners, it would, most likely, have already lost control over stronger partners.

Latin America was chosen as the focus because, traditionally, it has been considered the most subordinate to the United States of all geographic areas. It has been, for geographic, historical and strategic reasons the most captive international political clientele of the United States since the 19th century. For all these reasons one can argue that if American hegemony was to be declining, Latin America would be the last region to show it. If empirical results show trends of foreign policy disengagement from the United States in Latin America, this is to say diminishing compliance with the hegemon, it would be plausible to argue that decline of American hegemony is actually taking place. If the thesis of American hegemonic decline holds true in Latin America, it will, most likely, hold true everywhere else.

1.2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The following paragraphs will be devoted to review the literature available that has covered the core issues related to the study of the international relations of powerless countries, in general, during the last three decades. Also, a review is presented of the principal issues concerning the study of the relationship between Latin America and the United States, in particular, during the same time framework.

1.2.1. Foreign policy

In general, prior to 1979, little attention had been paid to the empirical study of the international behavior of secondary or "satellite" nations . For many years, scholars in the international politics field focussed mainly on the East-West conflict and their reading of the "doings" of secondary nations was mostly framed within the cold-war context. In the words of Organski [1968] the study of world politics owed its attention to "the doings" of the "great nations":

the doings of America and Russia, Britain and China, and the other great nations. It is not much concerned with relations between Iceland and Liberia or with the latest twist of foreign policy in Paraguay [...] They are simply less powerful. What they or their government do does not have much effect on the rest of the world [Organski 1968: 101].

In the following paragraphs a chronological brief review of the development of the study of foreign policy during the post World War II will be presented.

a. Classic Literature on Foreign policy

The bipolar system that was prevalent during the post World War II period was characterized by a highly structured and hierarchical distribution of power¹. The major actors within that international arrangement were two superpowers, a few major powers still essential to the functioning of the system and a large number of irrelevant actors clustered in either one of the two poles of power. A review of the literature of the field, during the decades of 1950s and 1960s², would yield the conclusion that the dominant way of looking at the post World War II was, for the most part, reduced to the interaction between East and West blocks in a competition for world control. The international behavior of

¹ For a classic typology of systems based on power distribution see M. Kaplan, System Process in International Politics, New York: Praeger, 1957.

² For an extensive review of this literature see Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976; and James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, New York: Harper and Row, 1981.

secondary nations was almost always interpreted along these lines.

Twenty four years after the publication of Organski's book what is relevant in the study of world politics has changed to accommodate new events and developments in international politics. In today's world it is no longer true that the "doings" of small countries or their governments are unimportant. This is not to say that disparity in power has ceased to exist. Large and powerful states still "run the show", but it is evident that during the last twenty years powerful states have been facing the necessity of taking smaller countries into consideration, especially if they are to keep their privileged positions in the world. This became particularly true as a result of the oil embargo of 1974. It is also true that the discipline of international relations had to undergo some adjustments in the standard analysis of world power³ and politics to respond to the changing demands of the times.

By the end of the sixties the predominance of Realism⁴ in the American study of international politics did not allow

³ For an analysis of use of the concept of power at present and current "Realism" in the field see Michael P. Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics, South Carolina: University of South California Press, 1990.

⁴ See Hans Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Knopf, 1965.

the realization that maintenance of power and protection of the status quo required more than plainly "showing muscle". In 1969 Deutsch wrote that the central question in the study of world politics is to determine "who is stronger and who is weaker" and that this in itself would tell us "who will get his way and who will have to give in" [Deutsch 1969: 257]. In other words, it will refer to who would exercise power and who would have to submit to it.

Events in the early and middle seventies showed that small and weak countries could cause a great deal of distress to the international system, and have direct effects in the domestic politics of powerful nations. The oil embargo of 1974 brought panic, energy shortages, inflation and the realization of a new sense of vulnerability to strong industrialized nations. The governments of such countries had to be mobilized to implement programs to deal with the situation and to prevent a disastrous future. Business, government and the academic communities had to join efforts to develop alternative sources of energy. It made it clear that this was an interdependent world and that strong industrialized countries were also vulnerable to the effects of the behavior of other not so strong nations. Furthermore, the apparent success of the "cartel type" organization, introduced by OPEC, encouraged a number of raw material producing countries to organize themselves around

international associations of producers. Such efforts were the subject of intense discussions within the United Nations General Assembly meetings all through the decade of 1970s calling for a New International Economic Order. All of these factors introduced the imminent need to incorporate the study of the "not so great nations" to the world politics discipline in the "first world".

During the seventies, a number of new explanatory foci appeared in the international politics literature in the United States. Slowly, new concepts such as dependence⁵, dependency⁶, interdependence⁷, integration, etc, started to

⁵ See W. Andrew Axline, "Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World" in International Organization, Vol. 31, No. 1, Winter 1977, pp. 83, 106. James Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: a Structural and Behavioral Analysis" in International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 1, Winter 1978, pp. 13-44, see also "Introduction: Dependence and Dependency in the Global System" in the same volume, pp. 1-12. James Caporaso, "Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Inequality, Dependence, and Exploitations" in James Kurt and Steven Rosen (eds.), Testing Economic Theories of Imperialism, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1974, pp. 87-116.

⁶ See Richard R. Fagen, "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a Dependencia Approach" in Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 3-36; Raymond Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument" in International Organizations, Vol. 32, (Winter 1978, pp. 51-78; Robert A. Packenham, "Plus ça change...The English Edition of Cardoso and Faletto's Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina" in Latin American Research Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 131-151; James Lee Ray and Thomas Webster, "Dependency and Economic Growth in Latin America", in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3, Sept. 1978, pp. 409-434;

spread. By the end of the decade the issue of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that incorporated the interests and desires of smaller countries was acknowledged as a relevant issue in world politics⁸. And the necessity that

Tony Smith, "The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited" in International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 4, Autumn 1981, pp. 755-761.

⁷ See David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: a Conceptual Analysis", in International Organization, Vol. 34, Autumn 1980, pp. 471-506; K.J. Holsti, "Change in the International System: Interdependence, Integration, and Fragmentation", in Ole R. Holsti, Change in the International System, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 23-53; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, Mass: Little Brown & Co, 1977; Stanley J. Michalak Jr., "Theoretical Perspectives for Understanding International Interdependence" in World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1, Oct. 1979.

⁸ For more details on this literature see Karl Brunner, "The New International Economic Order: A Chapter in a Protracted Confrontation" in ORBIS, Vol. 20, No. 1, Spring 1976, pp. 103-122; Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature", in International Organization, Vol. 33, No. 2, Spring 1979, pp. 257-302; Fred Hirsch, "Is There a New International Economic Order?" in International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 3, Summer 1976, pp. 521-532; David A. Lake, "Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-South Relations" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, 1987, pp. 217-234; Craig N. Murphy, "What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order Ideology" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1983, pp. 55-76; Robert L. Rothstein, "Regime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated Program for Commodities" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, Sept. 1984, pp. 307-328; and "Epitaph for a Monument to a Failed Protest? A North-South Retrospective" in International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 4, Autumn 1988. pp. 725-748.

large and powerful countries had to reconsider their own vulnerabilities was also at issue. Until that time scholars in the international politics field had mainly focussed on the East-West conflict and their reading of the "doings" of secondary nations had mostly been framed within the intra-bloc contest. In this regard, Holsti argued in 1982 that "only very recently have writers begun to explore foreign policy change as a response to conditions that have no connection with the cold war" [1982: 9]. The literature on foreign policy restructuring was one of the first to address the international political dynamics of satellite nations in the United States.

b. Foreign Policy Restructuring

The literature on foreign policy restructuring started exploring the issue of disengagement of satellite nations from their hegemon very early in the 1970s. This literature managed to grasp the non-military but often conflictive nature of the relationship. Scholars writing on the subject explored cases of foreign policy restructuring in both East [Huges and Volgy 1970] and West blocs [Volgy and Kenski 1976 and 1982; Holsti [et al] 1982; Volgy and Schwarz 1991]. And their findings show a greater degree of challenge to the

status quo than what would have been expected at a time of a still prevalent bipolar system. It is interesting to note that, even before the oil embargo, the literature on foreign policy restructuring was able to point out the existence and importance of satellite detachment from a hegemon.

In general, the most common choices available to satellite countries regarding political strategies in inter-bloc relations are alignment⁹ or disengagement. While alignment propitiates the smooth persistence of the status quo, disengagement is the major source of conflict within each bloc. Holsti, one of the few scholars that have addressed this issue, writes in this regard that

Almost by definition, an international system characterized by polarity is one where foreign policy orientations remain stable so long as hostility between bloc leaders persist. Those who attempt to break the roles assigned to them by mentors may face severe reprimands and occasionally military punishment. Disengagement, in brief, is a major source of international conflict [Holsti 1977 manuscript: 13-14].

Challenging power is conflictive in nature¹⁰. No matter

⁹ For further details of the standard use of these concepts see: Robert L. Rothstein "Alignment, Non-Alignment, and Small Powers: 1945-1965" in International Organization, Vol. 20, No. 3, Summer 1966, pp. 397-418.

¹⁰ Power has been defined as "the capacity of an individual, group, or nation to control the behavior of others in accordance with its own ends" [Organski, 1968: 104].- Morgenthau defines it as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" [1965: 28], while Holsti writes about the "act of influencing others and the use of capabilities to

what definition of power one chooses to use, the final implication is that, often, actions taken by the weaker party are coerced and not in its best interest. It is natural to expect that, as soon as they can, they will engage in continuous attempts to gain higher autonomy.

The exercise of power and the resulting attempts to seek greater autonomy do not necessarily involve the use of physical force, although they may have such outcome. As stated by Organski and Kugler [1980: 7] "The use of force to control behavior is the most demanding and infrequent of all the ways in which power is exercised". More common mechanisms for exercising control over others are "persuasion, rewards, punishment [...since...] all nations have needs that can only be satisfied by other nations" [Organski and Kugler 1980: - 6]. In a bipolar world --characterized by a high concentration of world resources on the hands of the two superpowers-- weaker nations often rely on their mentors for satisfaction of some of their most basic needs, and this becomes the main mechanism of control or exercise of power. Regardless of whether this is called dependence, dependency, interdependency, sensitivity or vulnerability, - depending on which theoretical approach is preferred, the fact is that superpower control over the members of their

wield that influence" [Summarized in Sullivan 1976: 160].

sphere of influence is executed mainly via the use of non--military means, although such methods are not excluded. On the other hand, resistance and dissatisfaction against the exercise of such control exists and takes also, for the most part, non-military forms¹¹.

One of the major merits of the literature on foreign policy restructuring is that it contemplates the struggle that dependent nations engage in to obtain greater autonomy from their mentors¹². This literature acknowledges that detachment from the hegemon is, in many cases, the most important priority in the foreign affairs of dependent countries. Also, dependent nations often perceive their own mentor as the source of their major international threat and not as much the mentor of the opposite bloc. Holsti [1982a] considers that changing such a position of vulnerability is the most important national priority for a large number of dependent nations.

¹¹ See Adrienne Armstrong, "The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence" in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 3, Sept. 1981, pp. 401-428.

¹² Mentor is defined as the dominant power or hegemon within a particular sphere of influence. At the time of a clear bipolar system the existing mentors in the world were the Soviet Union and the United States.

1.2.2. Latin America-U.S. Relations

The idea that Latin America and the United States share a common fate has been present since the early 19th century. The Monrow Doctrine, the Manifest Destiny, Bolivar's dream, and today's Initiative for the Americas are all manifestations of the notion that "the Americas" share a common fate, common interests and therefore common threats. The concept of Panamericanism¹³ has been present in the history of the region since the early 19th century, and comes back periodically to the scene of regional politics. Reality, however, has shown that the differences between Latin America and the United States have been severe enough to preclude any attempt of integration in a position of equality. The emergence of the United States as a major world power during the 20th century brought as a consequence the natural definition of the relationship between the United States and Latin America in which the latter was left to perform the role of a captive sphere of influence.

¹³ For a Latin American point of view on the meaning of Panamericanism see Alonso Aguilar Monteverde, Pan Americanism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

a. Historical Account of the U.S.-Latin America Relationship

History shows that the relationship between the United States and Latin America is full of conflictive incidents. Since the 19th Century the United States has often responded with direct military intervention¹⁴ to these countries when changes in their behavior threatened the American leadership¹⁵. Given the differential in capabilities between the United States and Latin America, the nature of the relationship has been of an enormous Latin American dependence on the United States. Manipulation of economic aid¹⁶, military aid¹⁷, quotas on imports, exports,

¹⁴ See Merilee Grindle, "Armed Intervention and U.S.-Latin American Relations" in Latin American Research Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1981, pp. 207-217.

¹⁵ See G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, New York: Free Press, 1977; James D. Theberge and Roger W. Fontaine, Latin America: Struggle for Progress, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1977; Edward J. Williams, Latin American Politics. A Developmental Approach, Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1975; and The Political Themes of Inter-American Relations, Belmont, CA: Duxbury, 1971.

¹⁶ See Michael J. Francis, "La Ayuda Económica de los Estados Unidos a América Latina como Instrumento de Control Político" en Foro Internacional, No. 48, 1972, pp. 433-452; Stephen S. Kaplan, "The Distribution of Aid to Latin America: A Cross-National Aggregate Data and Time Series Analysis", in Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1975, pp. 37-60; Thomas Eugene Pasquarello, Human Rights and U.S. Bilateral Aid Decisions Toward Africa and Latin America. Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1987; Lars Schoultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America. A Comparative

multinational operations abroad¹⁸, international organizations, etc. have been the normal means the United States has utilized to exercise control over the Latin American region. Recourse to military intervention --in general --has been the last option.

In the specific case of the study of Latin American foreign policy, it was not until the late seventies that the "international relations" community started to pay serious

Analysis of Foreign Aid Distribution" in Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1981, pp. 149-170; Robert M. Smetherman and Bobbie B. Smetherman, "High Visibility Foreign Aid: The Alliance for Progress" in Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1971, pp. 52-54.

¹⁷ See Michael J. Francis, Military Assistance and Influence: Some Observations, Military Issues Research Memorandum. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1977; William Bruce Garret, Arms Transfers, Congress, and Foreign Policy. The Case of Latin America, 1967-1976. Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1982; Stephen S. Kaplan, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Latin America 1945-1974: Rational Strategy, Bureaucratic Politics, and Executive Parameters" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1975, pp. 399-431; Mervin G. Stottlemire, Measuring Foreign Policy: Determinants of U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America. Ph.D. Dissertation, Rice University, 1975.

¹⁸ See Rosario Green, "Inversión Extranjera, Ayuda y Dependencia en América Latina" en Foro Internacional, No. 45, 1971, pp. 1-26; Jerry L. Ingles and Loretta Fairchild. "Evaluating the Impact of Foreign Investment: Methodology and the Evidence for Mexico, Colombia and Brazil" in Latin American Research Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1977, pp. 57-70.

attention to the region¹⁹. For a long time American scholars, politicians and business people assumed that what was perceived as a threat for the U.S. was commonly perceived as such throughout the region. In general, there was lack of sensitivity to recognize the importance that achieving greater autonomy from the United States had for Latin American nations. Also, that their failure to do so was perceived by many of these nations as a greater threat than any form of communist infiltration. Very few scholars in the U.S. managed to grasp this fact. Dreier [1968], for example, could predict an increase in nationalism in the Latin American area. He could also foresee the efforts made to achieve greater independence, to develop autonomously, and split from the United States.

It was not until the Nicaraguan revolution succeeded, that a significant number of scholars in the United States started considering the importance of the rest of the "Americas" for security purposes²⁰. The defense of the

¹⁹ This is true, at least, in the United States. The most prestigious American journals on international relations started publishing articles on Latin American international politics in 1979 and early 1980s.

²⁰ See Margaret Daly Hayes, "Security to the South: United States Interests in Latin America" in International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1980, pp. 130-151; Jorge I. Domínguez, "The United States and its Regional Security Interests: the Caribbean, Central, and South America" in Daedalus, Vol. 104, No. 4, Fall 1980, pp. 115-133.

Western Hemisphere and the Latin American participation in it became a major priority for the protection of the interests of the United States in the continent [Marcella 1985]. The question of "how to avoid more Nicaraguas" occupied the minds of scholars and politicians during the decade of the 1980s²¹.

Prior to that point in time, a search of the literature reveals some attention paid to the region during the aftermath of the Cuban revolution. Issues such as insurgency, counterinsurgency and revolution caught the attention of scholars and policy makers. The Alliance for Progress was the most important theme in the Inter-American speech of the decade of the 1960s, particularly for Latin Americans [Sepúlveda 1967; Urquidi 1962].

Luciano Tomasini [1988] analyzes the development of the relationship between Latin America and the United States in the post World War II period. His argument states that events deriving from the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution isolated Latin America from the rest of the world. According to the author, until the 1970s, the relationships of Latin America were heavily concentrated on the United States. It was during

²¹ See Jeffrey W. Barrett, "Preventive Foreign Policy in Latin America: How to Avoid More Nicaraguas" in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1988, pp. 171-181.

this decade --the 1970s-- that change started to occur. Notions of interdependency were introduced and efforts were made to develop a stronger relationship with new actors such as Japan and China.

As a result of the oil embargo, a new spirit developed within raw material exporters that was translated into vital support of the Group of 77 [Tomasini 1988]. Simultaneously, an innovative phenomenon took place in Latin America with the growth of regionalism introduced by the Andean Common Market in the 1960s [Avery and Cochrane 1973]. Some studies record a new attitude being developed by Latin America as a result of the disenchantment brought by the failure of the Alliance for Progress [Suárez 1970; Wiarda 1987]. The authors made reference to the consensus achieved in Viña del Mar where most Latin American countries started to speak as a group. At that point they unanimously rejected the broken promises brought by the Alliance for Progress [Suarez 1970; Wiarda 1987].

The events of the 1970s had enormous importance in setting new terms in the relationship that Latin America was going to have with the United States. As mentioned above, the failure of the Alliance for Progress led Latin American countries to accept the fact that it was their responsibility to look for alternative sources for their security and wellbeing. The "broken promises" --to use Suárez's terms--

were a clear sign that the commitment of the United States toward the region had limitations. Latin American governments, during that time, engaged in serious efforts to construct integrative regional economic institutions. - Organizations such as the Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC) and the Andean Common Market started operating [Urquidí 1967; Panico 1977; Avery and Cochrane 1973] at the time even though with not much success.

It was also during the 1970s that the Latin American effort to explain its reality, from a Latin American point of view, spread out not only throughout the region, but throughout the continent. Such an effort had started during the decade of the sixties.

The Latin American dependency literature blossomed during that time [Cardoso 1977; Cardoso and Faletto 1978; Dos Santos 1969 and 1970; Gunder Frank 1967, 1969 and 1974; Galeano 1973; Green 1973; Ianni 1974; Jaguaribe 1973; Ocampo 1976; Pinto 1974; Sunkel 1972; Valenzuela 1978] and was translated to several other languages.

The oil embargo of 1973-4 had important consequences in the way raw material producing countries viewed their own strength and choices vis a vis developed countries. It was a trial time in which these countries went through a process of testing their strengths and negotiating capabilities. Latin America was not the exception. During this decade Latin

American countries tested their negotiating power [Lagos 1980] vis a vis the United States. It was at that time that, at least in some issues, Latin America started to learn how to contend with the U.S. administration and win. A good example of this was in trade negotiations. According to Odell [1980], in recent times, when negotiating the United States wins more often than Latin America, but not all the time. He argues that Latin America has been testing a series of techniques that seem to work for them to optimize their position vis a vis the U.S. [Odell 1980].

According to Tomassini, the decade of the eighties was characterized by a policy of compromising [1988]; and such political approach corresponds with the scholarly work made on the subject. The decade of the eighties brought a major shift in the understanding of Latin American international politics. Production of scholarship on Latin America was more abundant and also reflected a conscious effort made to understand the point of view of Latin America [Casasola 1984; Ferguson 1987; Ferris 1986; Lagos and Plaza 1985; Lowenthal 1986 and 1987; Muñoz 1987; Tomasini 1988; Wiarda 1987]. It was at this point that scholars started to emphasize the need that the United States had to listen to Latin America instead of simply trying to impose its will [Linowitz 1989]. - Lowenthal [1986], for example, claimed that United States' policies toward the region were outdated. He argued that new

approaches leading toward realistic consideration of finances, trade and migration were necessary if the United States was to have an effective foreign policy toward the region [Lowenthal 1986]. He insisted --in agreement with millions of Latin Americans-- that the major threat to the United States was not as much the political instability in Central America but the economic crisis throughout the region [1987]. It was clear that the Latin American relative economic situation had declined during the last four decades. Just as an illustration of this fact, according to Martner's study [1984], in 1950 11% of the total world exports came from Latin America, in 1984 only 5% came from the region [Martner 1984]. The widespread realization of this fact brought a series of criticisms against the lack of a U.S. unified foreign policy toward Latin America²² that could respond appropriately to the changing necessities of the relationship with the region. Pedro San Juan addresses this issue [1980] and explains the difficulty of constructing a unified foreign policy. The author finally suggests that the design of individual policies for each Latin American country would be a more feasible solution. He insists that individual national economic growth is "the best way to counterbalance

²² See Viron P. Vaky, "Political Change in Latin America: A Foreign Policy Dilemma for the United States" in Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1986, pp. 1-15.

Castro" [San Juan 1980: 38], meaning the communist threat to the region and that this should be an important issue to be considered by foreign policy decision makers.

b. Latin America in World Politics.

When analyzing the events of the 1970s as well as the literature published at the time²³, it is noticeable that, since the middle of that decade, Latin America was already searching for a new role in international politics [Hellman and Rosenbaum 1975]. The publication of Luigi R. Einaudi' edited book [1974b] Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of its Future, is a clear illustration of the realization of this phenomenon. Pollock and Zuntz's work [1978] is another important example. Their study attempts to explain the increasing quest for autonomy of Latin America as a function of being a newly-emerging middle income region.

The literature on Inter-American relations has been discussing changes in patterns of interaction between the United States and Latin American nations [Atkins 1977; Casasola 1984; Ferguson 1987; Ferris 1986; Theberge 1977; Williams 1971, 1975] for the last twenty years. It is not

²³ See Jorge I. Domínguez, "Concensus and Divergence: The State of the Literature on Inter-American Relations in the 1970's" in Latin American Research Review, Vol. 13, 1978, pp. 87-126.

uncommon to read about shifts in power --particularly economic power-- that benefit the relative position of Latin America vis a vis the United States (at least of some Latin American countries). Bitar [1984] argues that "a shift in relative strength took place during [...the 1970s] that created the potential for achieving a new balance of power" [Bitar 1984: 3]. Lowenthal characterizes the relationship of the United vis a vis Latin America as that of hegemonic decline [1976, 1983 and 1986] or "the end of the hegemonic presumption", to use his own words. George [1988] makes predictions on the future of the Inter-American relations under the light of American hegemonic decline. Other authors, such as Morales [1984] conclude that the politics of the U.S. toward the region was designed to rehabilitate the declining hegemony on behalf of "national security" [Morales 1984: 66].

Bitar, as most other scholars, acknowledges that such "shifts also created tension in the old pattern of inter--American security links" [Bitar 1984: 3]. The nature of the relationship is, commonly, defined as of increasing deterioration. In 1983 Harrison could foresee such a fact and wrote on this regard that

a large majority [of scholars] expect further deterioration [in solidarity] [...] In the long run, many think that the attitude of Latin America toward the United States will change from Third World indifference to [...] hostility" [1983: 1].

Some studies place the responsibility for such changes on Latin American nationalism [Avery and Cochrane 1973; Dreier 1968; Suarez 1970], changes on domestic affairs [Lowenthal 1987; Muñoz 1987]; some others, on the Latin American reaction to specific American foreign policy behavior [Morales 1963 and 1964], while others blame the changes occurring in the world power structure [George 1988; Lowenthal 1976, 1983, 1986; Morales 1984]. There is however, a certain degree of consensus in the fact that the tendencies of Latin American behavior lean toward a greater degree of autonomy.

The issue of American loss of control over Latin America has been addressed by a number of scholars [George 1988; Enaudi 1974; Gerassi 1963; Hellman and Rosenbaum 1975; Hilton 1969; Hurrell 1986; Jervis 1986; Lowenthal 1976, 1983, 1986], however, very few have utilized empirical analysis to test such hypotheses. Most studies available today on the subject are based on historical and journalistic argumentation with little quantitative support.

It is the intention of this dissertation to empirically test if secular patterns of disengagement are present in the relationship of Latin American nations with the United States; if such patterns are associated with the hegemonic capabilities of the U.S.; also, to test if such patterns are a function of changes in the levels of dependency, domestic

capabilities or the relative position of countries in the World System. Finally it is intended to discover if the combination of the previous approaches explain better the appearance of foreign policy restructuring.

1.3. SUMMARY

From the review of the literature presented in previous pages one can emphasize the following points:

a) The study of foreign policy neglected, for the most part, the study of the behavior of the "not so powerful" nations until the mid seventies.

b) The effects of the oil embargo and the possibility of the spread out of raw material producers associations, during the mid seventies, forced the acknowledgement that strong industrialized nations were also vulnerable to the behavior of secondary nations. During that time, new concepts such as interdependency, dependency and vulnerability were introduced to the discipline of foreign affairs. Such concepts incorporated the "not so powerful nations" into the picture.

c) The literature on foreign policy restructuring was the first to acknowledge the conflictive nature of the relationship between satellite nations and their mentor.

d) For the most part, the literature also neglected the study of Latin America until the late seventies --with exception of the Cuban chapter.

e) A dramatic change is registered in the amount of attention paid to Latin America during the eighties due to the threat of spreading revolutions.

f) Studies have been conducted on the tendencies over time in the relationship between Latin America and the United States. Most of them show a certain amount of consensus on the fact that the tendency is toward greater autonomy for the time period under study.

g) No empirical studies that prove this fact have been conducted yet, nor explanatory empirical work has been developed on the issue.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON FOREIGN POLICY DISENGAGEMENT

The previous review of the literature suggests that there is a certain degree of consensus among specialists on Latin America regarding the nature of the Inter-American relations of the last thirty years. It has been widely accepted that the foreign policy of Latin American nations toward the United States has been characterized by an increasing tendency to seek greater autonomy from American guidelines. Furthermore, the forecast has been that such a tendency will continue to persist in the years to come. No systematic efforts, however, have been made to empirically trace and explain such patterns. Until now, most of what is known on the subject is based on non empirical research, therefore the relevancy of undertaking empirical analysis on the subject.

It is important to mention that, although the object of study of this dissertation is the foreign policy of Latin American nations, the focus is restricted to the study of foreign policy behavior. It is accepted that there is a wide difference between foreign policy and foreign policy behavior in which the first implies intentions, goals, programs etc. [Callahan, Brady and Herman 1982: 9] while the second is

limited to actual behavior. It is the same difference that exists between decision making dynamics and actual outcome. Even though the study of foreign policy has the potential to joining a numerous variety of elements that account for particular events, focusing on behavior provides discrete, definable unit of observation that enables objective systematic research. It is this kind of research that allows for explanations that can derive generalizations that are theoretically relevant.

2.1. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

For the purposes of this research, and based on the literature available on the subject, the concept of foreign policy "disengagement" was defined as a secular trend showing increase in "distance" from the United States on three dimensions (political, economic, and diplomatic) of foreign policy behavior of twenty Latin American nations.

The basic definition of the concept of "distance" was taken from the literature on foreign policy restructuring that has defined "distance" as:

the degree of congruence in the behavior of one state to the behavior of another, or the collective behavior of a group of states. An increase or decrease in deviations from the single or the collective --measured through intergroup or intragroup interactions-- is the referent for changes in the relative distance of any of the states [Huges and Volgy 1970: 462].

Disengagement corresponds to the secular decrease of congruence in the behavior of Latin American nations vis a vis the behavior of the United States.

It is important to mention that the literature on foreign policy restructuring distinguishes between change as restructuring and normal change in foreign policy. Holsti defines these concepts as follows:

normal foreign policy change, which is usually slow, incremental and typified by low linkages between sectors [...], and foreign policy restructuring, which usually takes place more quickly, expresses an intent for fundamental change, is non-incremental and usually involves the conscious linking of different sectors [Holsti 1982: 2].

This work is interested in studying normal foreign policy change as opposed to foreign policy restructuring. Slow, incremental change that builds up over time is the subject of interest of this research. A previous paper exploring foreign policy restructuring¹ in Latin America suggested that, given the enormous differential in capabilities that separates Latin America from the United States, focussing on normal change appeared to be a more meaningful method of analyzing disengagement for the region.

This dissertation will, then, focus on normal foreign policy change. Whenever the concept of disengagement is used

¹ See Pinal, Sylvia A. "Latin American Foreign Policy Restructuring. A Struggle for Autonomy", mimeo, March 1991.

in this research it will be expressing a restricted meaning of the word since it will only refer to normal foreign policy change and it will be excluding restructuring.

2.2. LATIN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT

The main thesis of this dissertation is that the Latin American nations have been undergoing a process of steady disengagement from the United States in a secular manner during the post World War II period. The first goal to attain is to trace patterns of increasing foreign policy distance vis a vis the United States.

The second goal is to explain what causes such disengagement. Given the prevalent tendencies in the study of foreign policy of Latin American nations, one can distinguish four contending schools that offer a relevant explanation of the phenomenon in question. The first of such explanations focusses on the decline of American hegemony as the principal predictor of Latin American disengagement. The main argument behind it is that a satellite nation would disengage as a consequence of the failure of the hegemonic nation to exercise control because its power in the international system is being undermined. The second school of thought, the

dependency approach², would claim that regardless of the hegemonic position in the world, foreign policy disengagement from "the core" --in this case the United States-- would only be possible as the result of structural changes in the nature of the dependency ties that link these countries to the United States. The third explanation, based on modernization and national attribute arguments, would insist that it is the inner growth and development of societies, plus the competence of their governments, which best explains their success in achieving greater degrees of autonomy. Finally, the fourth explanation, the World System school of thought would argue that as weaker countries move upwardly in the world system stratification structure, they will naturally seek greater autonomy.

The following paragraphs present a brief review of the principal arguments and concepts utilized by each one of these four schools of thought as they have been used in the literature. Later on, a fifth explanation that integrates the

² Often times dependency and World Systems approaches are linked together and considered as one. In this study those two approaches are kept and tested separately because the author considers that there are major differences in the theoretical components of each one of the two approaches. The similarities come from the World Systems borrowing of concepts from dependency. However the theoretical organization of such concepts reflects an enormous influence of the American functional-structuralism and social stratification theories that is not present in the dependency approach.

previous four will be offered. And finally, a sixth explanatory model, based on the integrative one, that introduces the mechanics of the interrelations among independent variables plus a geographic location variable, is presented. Each one of these theoretical arguments will be the foundation of a particular model that will be empirically tested later on. The result of such tests are presented in Chapter 5.

2.3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODELS IN THE STUDY

2.3.1. MODEL 1: Hegemony and Hegemonic Decline.

The notion of hegemony, its cycles and its different phases have been studied extensively by economists, sociologists and internationalists³. For the most part, the study of hegemony and cycles of hegemony have been tied to the study of war and the search for regularities regarding warfare and world order [Modelski 1983, Thompson 1983 a & b, Organski and Kugler 1980, Doran and Parsons 1980, Gilpin 1981, Wallerstein 1983, Wallerstein and Hopkins 1982a & b, Bergesen 1980 & 1983, Chase-Dunn and Robinson 1979; Spiezio

³ for a comprehensive review of the literature available on cycles of hegemony see Joshua S. Goldstein Long Cycles. Prosperity and War in the Modern Age, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988.

1990]. The literature presents an enormous amount of disagreement regarding questions such as causality, timing, and temporality of the hegemony cycles. Nevertheless, there is certain consensus regarding the basic definition of the concept of hegemony. Goldstein [1988], who uses political and military as much as economic indicators to measure power offers a widely accepted definition of **hegemony** that reads as follows:

[...] the position of the leading country in the world, which is able, by virtue of superior economic and military capabilities, to largely shape the rules by which international relations (both economic and security relations) are conducted [Goldstein 1988: 112].

Goldstein's definition of "hegemonic power" reads:

A hegemonic power is a core state that commands an unrivaled position of economic and military superiority among the core states and is thus able largely to shape the operation of the international system [Goldstein 1988: 5].

It is noticeable that, in spite of many other differences, most scholars agree in characterizing the post World War II period as the era of United States hegemony --at least as far as the Western World is concerned. Regarding the characteristics of the American hegemony Goldstein writes:

American hegemony resembles previous instances of hegemony in many ways. The United States emerged from World War II with a monopoly on nuclear weapons and military predominance throughout the world except in the Soviet and Eastern Europe (a defacto outcome

recognized at Yalta). Like previous hegemonies, the United States had survived the war with a healthy economy, while those of the other major powers were in ruins [1988: 344].

In spite of the existing consensus among scholars around the nature of the Post World War II period, in recent years, discussion emerged regarding the durability of American hegemony. It is important to remember that a

significant feature of hegemonic leadership is that it is intrinsically an unstable, transitory phenomenon [Rupert and Rapkin 1985: 157].

Under the light of this consideration, it is assumed that decline of American hegemony will occur. The question is when? While some scholars such as Modelski [1981: 80-81], Russett [1985] and Strange [1987] view the decline of American hegemony still far in the future, many others write about American decline of power starting in the late sixties [Milner and Snyder 1988; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982a; Wallerstein 1983; Bousquet 1979; Goldstein 1988; Kennedy 1987]. Rupert and Rapkin [1985: 157] mention 1970 as the key year after which decline of hegemony appears more steady. Doran and Parsons [1980: 956] place the downward inflection point of the U.S. cycle of national capabilities as early as 1952.

Goldstein analyzes certain current patterns of world power interaction and compares them with existing patterns in previous cases of hegemonic decline and concludes that:

These patterns suggest new perspectives on the contemporary world situation. Currently, the United States seems to be in an early stage of hegemonic decline. The next hegemon is indeed unclear -- China? Japan? A Western European consortium? [Goldstein 1988: 347].

The major difference in the conclusions reached by the two approaches mentioned above, lies in whether the operational definition of hegemony is based on political and military power or if it includes other economic elements such as production and trade. When economic elements are incorporated into the definition, the conclusions often indicate the presence of hegemonic decline⁴. Rupert and Rapkin [1985] address this problem and excluded altogether political and military variables to better focus on strict "capabilities". This is to say, they focus on measures "referencing capabilities in the production, commercial and financial spheres of the world economy" [Rupert and Rapkin 1985: 156]. Their results show strong evidence of the United States loss of relative weight vis a vis the world economy in the post World War II period in favor of greater world interdependence.

⁴ For further details on the different positions regarding this argument see Helen Milner and Jack Snyder, "Lost Hegemony?" in International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 4, Autumn 1988. The authors present a critical review of Susan Strange "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony" in International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4, 1987, pp. 551-574.

In addition to the claim that the United States has lost its relative share of the world availability of resources --capabilities--, there is a parallel claim that emphasizes the interdependence nature of the contemporary world. Bergsten states that

The United States has simultaneously become much more dependent on the world economy and much less able to dictate the course of international economic events. The global economic environment is more critical for the United States and is less susceptible to its influence [Bergsten 1982: 13].

In brief, numerous scholars have argued that the declining phase of the hegemonic cycle of the United States has already begun. A number of empirical studies have been conducted trying to identify trends of U.S. hegemonic decline [Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982a; Wallerstein 1983; Bergesen, Fernandez and Sahoo 1986; Doran and Parsons 1980; Bousquet 1979; Rupert and Rapkin 1985; Goldstein 1988; Kennedy 1987; Dowson and Rupert 1985]. A number of scholars offer different points in time as the start of the process of decay. This is a conclusion, however, that has not reached consensus. Influential scholars such as Modelski [1981] and Russett [1985] do not accept having reached yet the declining period of American hegemony.

It is important to mention that most scholars working on this subject share the commonality of defining hegemonic

decline as a decrease in the U.S. relative share of power vis a vis other core nations. The international system, however, is composed of more than purely core countries. And the exercise of hegemony involves more than intra-core competition for power. As Hopkins and Wallerstein [1979] wrote "[current] interstate relations center around the relation among core powers, and their ability to control peripheral areas" [497]. Although control of the periphery is an integral part of the exercise of hegemony, not much has been written about the loss of such control and its implications. In general, the literature that has addressed such matters tends to frame hegemonic loss of control of the periphery as part of the inter-core competition for power. That is to say that it is assumed that as the hegemon loses control, some other core power gains it. Very little attention has been paid to the peripheral struggle for autonomy that drives the daily design of foreign policy of most peripheral countries. With exception of the literature on New International Economic Order, foreign policy restructuring, and regional studies this matter has, for the most part, not received great attention. Not much has been written either on the importance of preserving peripheral support to continue to exercise hegemony. The potential contribution that certain autonomy seeking behavioral

patterns in the periphery may have to precipitate the outcome of hegemonic decline has been neglected.

The first research question to address in this work is to empirically confirm whether Latin American disengagement from the United States has actually been taking place. Once the phenomenon of disengagement is accepted as existent, the second step guiding this research would be to determine whether such a phenomenon is related to the process of decrease of American hegemonic capabilities.

It is interesting to note that Latin American foreign policy disengagement coincides somehow in time with the claimed decline of American hegemony [Milner and Snyder 1988, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982a, Wallerstein 1983, Doran and Parsons 1980, Bousquet 1979, Rupert and Rapkin 1985, Goldstein 1988, Kennedy 1987]. Given the nature of the relationship of Latin America with the United States it is plausible to argue that the Latin American disengagement recorded during the last decades is closely related to the United States declining hegemony.

The theoretical argument applicable to the case of Latin America would suggest that, as the United States declines, it loses its ability to impose its rule over the rest of the continent. At the same time it has to face competition of other rising countries --such as Japan and Western Europe-- in the leadership of its closest sphere of influence. It is

interesting to mention, however, that not much is said in the literature about the relationship between the United States and its closest political clientele, Latin America⁵, when it comes to declining hegemony.

2.3.2. MODEL 2: Dependency and dependence.

The concept of dependence is probably the one that has been most commonly associated with the policy making process of weak countries. In words of Bruce Moon:

The conventional wisdom of international relations holds that the foreign policy behavior of weak states is largely determined by external forces. Such a view dates from the most venerable texts of international relations theory and is now thought so exceptional that it no longer requires defense [Moon 1985: 297].

In recent times scholars have explored such understanding of the political process in dependent societies

⁵ Among the few exceptions we count Larry N. George, "La Decadencia del Dragón: U.S. Hegemonic Decline and the Future of Interamerican Relations" in International Relations, London, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1988, pp. 257-280; Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Ronald Reagan and Latin America: Coping with Hegemony in Decline" in Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's, edited by Kenneth Oye, et. al., Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1983; and "The United States and Latin America: Ending the Hegemonic Presumption" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 1, 1976, pp. 199-213.

and have engaged in an effort to study the issue in a systematic empirical manner⁶.

Two opposite arguments have been made relating dependency with distancing from a mentor country. And two different concepts have been used to describe a dependent relationship: dependence and dependency.

Holsti [1982a] uses the concept of dependence and argues that highly dependent countries are more likely to engage in politics of disengagement --although he is mainly referring to foreign policy restructuring-- in a natural effort to seek higher autonomy. His reasoning is that their situation of dependence makes them perceive themselves as highly vulnerable. In Holsti's words:

certain conditions, particularly dependence, vulnerability, perceptions of weakness and massive external penetration, predispose some governments to restructure their foreign policies and that sometimes the major residues of dependence and interdependence are seen as threats which in turn, compel government

⁶ Among the most prominent examples of such efforts we find Neil Richardson, "Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance", American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, 1976, pp. 1098-1109; Richardson, Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978; Richardson and Charles Kegley, "Trade Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance: A Longitudinal Analysis" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1980, pp. 191-222; Adrienne Armstrong, "The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence" in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1981, pp. 401-428; James Ray, "Dependence, Political Compliance, and Economic Performance: Latin America and Eastern Europe" in Kegley and Pat MacGowan, eds., The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981.

to build moats and create more 'distance' between themselves and their mentors" [Holsti 1982b: 199].

As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the major merits of the literature on foreign policy restructuring is that it contemplates the struggle that dependent nations engage in to obtain greater autonomy from their mentors. This literature acknowledges that detachment from the hegemon is, in many cases, the most important priority in the foreign affairs of dependent countries. Also, that dependent nations often perceive their own mentor as the source of their major international threat and not as much the mentor of the opposite bloc.

Holsti defines "dependency" as

a situation where the "smaller" state can act in its domestic and/or external policies only with the implicit or explicit consent of another state, and where the capacity to threaten or reward in the relationship is highly asymmetrical [...] in other words: the major power --what we call the mentor-- establishes the parameters for the political and economic actions of the dependent state, and has the means to ensure conforming behaviour [Holsti 1982: 11].

Holsti also considers that changing such a position of vulnerability is the most important national priority for a large number of dependent nations.

The opposite argument is made by the Latin American dependency school. Dependencistas would argue that high levels of dependency would make it impossible to break away

from the mentor. In essence that disengagement from a mentor is only possible as the dependency ties of satellite nations are diminishing.

The "dependency" approach first, and the World-Systems school later have made an enormous contribution to the understanding of the nature of the relationship between core and peripheral nations. Most of the literature available on "dependency", however, focusses on the effects that a dependent relationship will have on the developmental --social, economic, and political-- process within peripheral countries. Little empirical research has been conducted on the effects of dependency on the foreign policy behavior of dependent countries [Richardson and Kegley 1980; Ray 1981].

The dependency argument, regarding foreign policy behavior, would indicate that the likelihood for a dependent Latin American country of having autonomy in foreign policy matters would be an inverse function of the level of dependency that such country has on the United States⁷. Highly dependent countries would be less likely to disengage from the United States than less dependent countries.

⁷ See Adrienne Armstrong, "The Political Consequences of Economic Dependence" in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 3, September 1981, pp. 401-428.

Although these two approaches view dependence or dependency as the motivator for distancing or not distancing, there is one major difference in their focus of analysis. While Holsti's argument is concerned with the motivation to disengage, the Dependencistas are concerned with the required capabilities for doing so. Holsti is trying to explain what would make a country interested in distancing from a mentor; the Dependencistas would be interested in explaining what would make this possible.

Both arguments are tested simultaneously here. The theoretical components of the theory are the same, the only variation would be the behavioral expectations that will be translated into the expected signs of the coefficients once the model is operationalized. At the end of the presentation of this research one should be able to know whether Holsti or the Dependencistas are closer in their expectations .

The literature shows that there is an important difference regarding the effects that economic dependency would have versus military dependency⁸ on the behavior of

⁸ Edward N. Muller presents an account of major differences on the effects that economic dependency and military dependency have on democratic performance of peripheral countries. He shows how military aid ties much stronger the recipient country to the wishes and interests of the United States. See "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, 1985, pp. 445-469.

dependent countries. High military dependency appears to have many more strings attached in terms of loyalty to the hegemon⁹ than does economic dependency. Because of this reason it was considered necessary to test the effects of military dependency separately from the effects of other types of economic dependency.

2.3.3. MODEL 3: National Attributes

This explanation focusses on domestic factors such as growth and development, type of government, levels of internal stability, government competence, weather, language, religion, etc., as the major explanatory variables that explain their behavior. In general, this approach tends to give enormous importance to the size and growth of the national capabilities of a country to explain its foreign policy behavior. Such literature argues that large and more developed countries are more likely to have an active foreign policy. A great deal has been written regarding the

⁹ See Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil" in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, ed. by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, pp. 110-137; also Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics. Changing Patterns in Brazil, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1971.

likelihood of larger and wealthier countries to initiate conflictive behavior (and behavior in general). Disengagement is one kind of potentially conflictive behavior that for being non-violent tends to be ignored. The national capability explanation argues that disengagement is most likely to occur in countries that are achieving rapid levels of growth, wealth and industrialization.

The classic literature on power¹⁰ emphasizes the notion of strength of national capabilities as a necessary condition for the exercise of power. At the same time, challenge to a given distribution of power --as disengagement represents-- would be more likely if there is a change in the availability of national capabilities of a specific country. National capability is, in most cases, equated with the availability of resources of one country --operational definitions such as GNP, size, population, etc. have been broadly used. Although there is a theoretical difference between power as national attributes and power as ability to influence [Sullivan 1976: 160] it is fair to say that these two dimensions of

¹⁰ For an extensive review of this literature see Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theory and Evidence, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976, Chapter 5; also Sullivan, Power in Contemporary International Politics, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990.

power cannot be separated¹¹. The ability to influence is going to be determined by the capability to influence. This is a proposition that holds true to explain superpower behavior as much as medium-range power or dependent country behavior.

In his World Politics [1968], Organski clearly distinguishes three groups of countries in terms of their capabilities and capacity to influence the international system. Organski mentions that, at first, countries are in a stage of "potential power" characterized by low productivity lack of industrialization. Then, he mentions a second set of countries that are undergoing a "transitional growth stage". These are countries rapidly industrializing and where urbanization and growth in national capabilities is increasing fast. The third set of countries are the ones that have achieved a state of "power maturity". These are countries fully industrialized [Organski 1968: Chapter 14].

It is important to note that Organski's study is aimed at explaining "power transition" and the likelihood of war

¹¹ For further details on the relationship between national attributes and foreign conflict behavior see: R. R. Rummel, "The Relationship Between Foreign Conflict Behavior" in J.D. Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics, New York: Free Press, pp. 187-214; N. Choucri and R.C. North, "Dynamics of International Conflict: Some Policy Implications of Population, Resources and Technology" in World Politics, Vol. 24, (Suppl.), pp. 80-122.

and not precisely foreign policy disengagement. Nevertheless, his argument is useful to understand the dynamics of disruption of a given status quo. Organski argues that conflicts are more likely to occur in cases of power transition "when power transition occurs, [...] and dissatisfied countries begin to increase their power, they become a threat to those in a position of dominance" [Sullivan 1976: 168]. Power here is defined in terms of national capabilities (attributes) and power transition in terms of growth.

An extrapolation of the power transition logic would tell that challenge to the status quo in the form of foreign policy disengagement is more likely to occur under situations of "power transition". Therefore, it is expected that countries clustered in the second category of Organski's classification --transitional growth-- will be more likely to undergo a process of disengagement gaining higher degrees of autonomy. The same argument would conclude that countries in the first group --potential power-- would be less likely to do so.

In brief, the reasoning behind the previous argument has two major components: 1) growing countries have a major stake in changing prevalent conditions for new conditions that better reflect their new status; 2) growing and industrializing countries have greater newly acquired

capabilities (resources) that they can mobilize to change the current status quo. In other words rapidly growing and industrializing countries are more likely to disengage because they want to (it is in their best interest) and they can (have greater capabilities). On the other hand fully "mature" countries have no interest in modifying the status quo while "potential power" nations have no means to do it.

In recent years scholars in the international relations field have made an important qualification on the claims that can be made based on the availability of national capabilities of nations. Robert Gurr [1988] argues that there is an important difference to be made between availability of national capabilities that a country has and the ability of its government to mobilize them. He claims that in order to account for explaining foreign policy one has to look not only at national capabilities but also at other domestic indicators of government competence. He looks at two principal components. The first of them, following Organski and Kugler [1980] focuses on governmental extractive capabilities. The second one addresses the issue of governmental durability and coherence, this is to say the ability of the government to politically perform effectively [Gurr 1988: 135]. It is this second issue that is considered to be of particular importance within the context of our subject matter.

The nature of foreign policy disengagement --an evolutionary, slow, incremental process that takes place over a long period of time-- allows to expect that such an outcome would only be possible under a situation of strong political domestic stability. Only a strong government that enjoys profound stability could lead its country through such a slowly evolving process. While dramatic domestic changes such as a coup d'etat or a revolution could account to explain foreign policy restructuring [Volgy and Kenski 1982: 465]¹² --radical foreign policy change--, such events would be highly disruptive for a trend of "normal" change. In their study on foreign policy restructuring, Volgy and Kenski [1982], made the point that "changes in levels of domestic conflict will be significantly related to distance change" [1982: 466].

Rosenau [1971] suggested that individual variables will be the most important predictors of the foreign policy behavior of less developed countries since they lack the necessary institutional support to guarantee political stable

¹² See also Joe D. Hagan, "Domestic Political Regime Changes and Third World Voting Realignment in the United Nations, 1946-1984" forthcoming in International Organization; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976", in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 33, No. 1, March 1989, pp. 3-35; Thomas J. Volgy and John E. Schwartz, "Does Politics Stop at the Water's Edge? Domestic Political Factors and Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Cases of Great Britain, France, and West Germany", in Journal of Politics, 1991.

continuity. Vergrof [1976] further elaborated on Rosenau's argument and wrote that

In accord with Rosenau's theory [1971] it is hypothesized that LDC's presenting high levels of elite instability will have unstable policies" [Vergrof 1976: 425].

Foreign policy disengagement is a policy project that requires, by definition, high levels of stability. Hence the necessity to introduce the hypothesis that a high level of domestic stability is a necessary condition --although not sufficient-- in order for foreign policy disengagement to take place.

It is suggested that countries presenting low levels of stability will be more likely to engage in foreign policy restructuring if they have the means to do it¹³. Countries enjoying medium levels of domestic stability will be more likely to conform to the status quo. And finally, countries recording a high level of political stability will be the ones engaging in a long term project of foreign policy disengagement.

The complete argument presented here states that high levels of stability coupled with increasing resources would yield greater levels of government competence and the combination of these three elements would lead to successful

¹³ As suggested by results presented by Volgy and Kenski 1982, pp. 466-467.

distancing from a mentor. The major argument behind this thesis is that in order to secure successful evolutionary foreign policy change the government has to be capable to govern and plan its policies. In the particular case of disengagement --the one type of distancing one is interested in here-- this argument is the most relevant. It is plausible to think that disengagement --a longitudinal process that is being followed on a thirty six year period-- is most likely to be achieved by countries with high levels of stability and with highly capable governments.

2.3.4. MODEL 4: Change of Position in the World System

World-System theory has introduced some notions derived from social stratification theory to the field of international relations. Under this point of view the world is conceived as a stratified system in which countries undergo certain mobility processes¹⁴. In general, their

¹⁴ Much earlier than the appearance of the World-System school of thought, the status discrepancy literature [East 1972, Lagos 1963, Galtung 1964] had explored the relevance of changes in status within the system to explain foreign policy behavior. Such literature argued that status discrepancy triggers conflict in the system or subsystem. While East tested this point at a systemic level, Galtung [1964] and Lagos [1963] tested it for Latin America and found strong evidence to support their point. Volgy and Kenski [1982] tested this proposition for Latin America in the context of system change and foreign policy restructuring.

position in the system is determined by the role each country plays within the international division of labor [see Wallerstein 1974 and 1980; Cardoso 1973; Evans 1979]. Several classifications of countries depending on their position in the international division of labor have been offered by different schools of thought [see Dixon 1985]. The dependency/world-systems [Wallerstein 1974 and 1980; Emmanuel 1972; Amin 1974; Chase-Dunn 1982; also Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1979] approach initially divided the globe into core, periphery and semi-periphery. The core is constituted of the wealthy industrialized countries that profit from an "unequal exchange" status quo and therefore have no interest in modifying it. The periphery is constituted of extremely dependent countries that specialize in the production of low value added goods. This situation keeps them economically impoverished and politically weak, having no possibility to exercise any influence in the system. This is the group that would benefit the most from greater autonomy since their relationship to the core is highly exploitative, however, the structural nature of their position makes it impossible for them to change their situation. The semi-periphery is constituted of medium range countries undergoing a process of

industrialization¹⁵ and upward mobility in the system¹⁶. As these countries move upwardly in the system they will increasingly diversify their relationships with the rest of the international community and eventually gain higher levels of autonomy. They will incrementally become business partners with the core until one day they become part of it. It is expected that as a country moves upwardly in the system it will naturally gain higher levels of autonomy vis a vis its core¹⁷.

Several studies have been conducted attempting to identify the characteristics of each one of the three component strata of the World System [Evans 1979a; Steiber 1979; Snyder and Kick 1979; Caporaso 1981; Bollen 1983; Dixon

¹⁵ For further details on the argument of dependent industrialization see Volker Bornschier, "Dependent Industrialization in the World Economy" in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 3, Sept. 1981, pp. 371-400.

¹⁶ See Christopher Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson, "Cycles, Trends and New Departures in World-System Development" in J.W. Meyer and M.T. Hannan, eds, National Development and the World System: Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979; Albert Bergesen and Ronald Schoenberg, "Long Waves of Colonial Expansion and Contraction, 1415-1969" in A. Bergesen, ed, Studies of the Modern World-System, New York: Academic Press, 1980, pp. 231-277.

¹⁷ This issue has been addressed, using different terminology, by David H. Pollock and Michael Zuntz, "The United States and Latin American Development: Some Thoughts on the Problems of a Newly-Emerging 'Middle-Income' Region", in Current Comment, No. 12, Ottawa: Carleton University, Norman Peterson School of International Affairs, 1978.

1985]. Network analysis [Snyder and Kick 1979; Steiber 1979] has been used since 1979 to cluster countries according to their trade flows. Such studies seem to support Wallerstein's division of the World System into "core", "periphery" and "semi-periphery". The literature shows a remarkable lack of consensus in the exact placement of individual countries. Countries like Mexico and Brazil are sometimes placed in the periphery and sometimes in the semiperiphery. Recently, Smith and White [1992] developed a classification that differentiates between Semiperiphery I and Semiperiphery II being the first one higher in status than the second. This is the classification used in this study, and given the arguments presented above one can expect that countries placed in the Semiperiphery I status are more likely to disengage than countries in the Semiperiphery II status. However, countries in both semiperipheral strata are more likely to disengage than countries in the Periphery, since the latter are not expected to have the structural means to do it.

2.3.5. MODEL 5: An Integrative Explanation of Foreign Policy Disengagement.

The theoretical arguments presented in previous pages focus on the analysis of bivariate explanations of foreign

policy behavior. It is also possible, however, to hypothesize that the outcome of foreign policy disengagement is a function of the effect of all four variables discussed above: decrease of hegemonic capability, decrease of the dependency ties on the United States, increase of domestic capabilities and upward mobility in the world system of Latin American countries. As can be seen all four variables rely on capabilities to explain foreign policy behavior, they just operate at different levels of analysis.

The hegemony argument looks at the capabilities available to the hegemon at the systemic level and claims that a loss of such capabilities will be translated into loss of control of the periphery. Disengagement becomes, therefore, a natural product of decay in hegemonic capabilities. The concept of hegemony provides information about the relative share of power of the hegemon vis a vis other core nations. It tells nothing, however, about the specific relationship between the hegemon and its peripheral clientele. We know that a declining hegemon, as declining as it may be, will always have much greater capabilities than any of its satellites. Even if relatively shrinking, the capabilities are there. The relevant question to address is how is it that the hegemon chooses to use them. The hegemon has several options. It could choose to use its capabilities to compete with other core countries and permit the

distancing of the periphery if the effort to preserve its closeness interferes with other priorities. It could, hypothetically, chose to keep the periphery close and surrender in its competition with other core countries; or it could chose to maintain a few strategically important satellites and release control of the rest.

The concept of dependency addresses better this issue. It actually gives information on the nature of the specific relationship of the hegemon vis a vis a particular country of its periphery. It has the potential of providing an insight into the effects of the choices made by the hegemon as far as how to use its capabilities in the periphery. It is possible to imagine --as was actually the case of Cuba and the Soviet Union-- a decaying hegemon that manages to keep a particular satellite dependent at the expense of sacrificing other priorities. In such a case disengagement would not take place and the hegemony argument by itself could not account for it.

So far the attention has been concentrated on the importance of the capabilities available to the hegemon and its choices on how to use such resources to play "power". Capabilities, however, are available to all countries even though they are not evenly distributed. So far, one has only looked at one side of the table, the side where the hegemon sits. In order to fully explain a foreign policy behavior

such as disengagement of dependent countries it would be necessary to incorporate the contribution of the disengaging country to the equation.

The domestic capability concept performs this function. It will provide information on the resources available to one country to account for its ability to seek greater levels of autonomy in its foreign policy behavior. It is expected that successfully disengaging from a hegemon is an operation that requires a certain amount of capabilities since it is a behavior that challenges --even if slowly-- the status quo.

It was mentioned earlier that the concept of hegemonic capability said nothing about the choices made by the hegemon on how to use its capabilities to deal with its periphery. The concept of dependency was necessary to account for such choices. The same thing is true for domestic capabilities. The concept of domestic capability says nothing about the choices made by governments on how to use such capabilities. The concept will only tell if a country has the necessary capabilities to disengage. It will tell nothing about whether it chooses to do it or not. Peripheral governments have choices too. They may chose to disengage if they perceive that it is possible and convenient. They may chose to restructure. They may chose not to disengage if the status quo is more favorable.


Once again the concept of dependency can reflect the combination of two elements in the behavior of satellite countries. On the one hand it will reflect --especially if looked at longitudinally-- the ability of a peripheral country to stop or reduce reliance on the capabilities of the hegemon. On the other hand it will show the willingness to do it. These two are necessary conditions for the exercise of autonomy. The concept of dependency, then, is the one that links both hegemonic capabilities and domestic capabilities of peripheral nations by absorbing both sets of choices made on how to use capabilities.

An important element to incorporate, in addition to the availability of domestic resources, will be the level of political stability that a country enjoys. The nature of the foreign policy phenomenon to be explained --disengagement-- requires by definition the necessary stability conditions to be built over time.

Finally, the relative position of a country in the world system is another element that would be necessary to have included in the equation. It will reflect the distance in status of a country from the hegemon and therefore its commonality in interests.

A model incorporating the above mentioned variables will look as follows:

Figure 2.1
AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL



And can be expressed in the following way:

$$Y = a + b_1(HC) + b_2(DEP) + b_3(DC) + b_4(WSP)$$

Where:

HC = hegemonic capability

DEP= dependency

DC = domestic capability of peripheral country

WSP = World System position

2.3.6. MODEL 6: An interaction effects explanation

The previously presented model (Model 5) expresses a theoretical argument that incorporates the component explanatory variables of the four major foci discussed earlier in this chapter. A more comprehensive explanation, however, would incorporate also the mechanics by which those variables are interrelated among each other. So the inclusion of some interaction variables would be essential to achieve a better explanation of foreign policy disengagement when joining several theoretical components.

It is relevant to theorize that the combination of hegemonic decline and decrease of the dependency ties would have a much stronger effect in the disengaging behavior of nations, than what each one of them would have if taken separately. One could argue that the decline of hegemonic capabilities would by itself facilitate a shift toward greater autonomy for satellite nations. On the other hand, a secular decrease in the levels of dependency would also facilitate the same phenomenon. When both elements are present and significant, however, the combined effects of

both will be much greater than the addition of the contribution of each variable to the stress placed on the system. A multiplicative interaction variable of these two variables (hegemonic decline and dependency) would reflect this phenomenon.

The same is true when it comes to the combination of the effect that dependency and national capabilities would have when operating simultaneously. Furthermore, one could argue that an interaction variable that combines the joint effect of dependency and national capabilities will manage to reflect the dynamics of the systemic distribution of power over time.


Since the purpose of constructing such explanatory model is to come up with an understanding as comprehensive as possible of the factors involved that account for foreign policy disengagement, it is appropriate to include also the geographic distance between countries.

Geographic distance is a factor that, perhaps for being so obvious, has not received the attention that deserves in the literature. Geographic proximity will naturally increase the probability of trade interaction, treaty activity, border conflicts. It will make military action easier to be taken. It will cause countries to share common geopolitical threats and concerns, etc. One could argue that, as countries are geographically more proximate to each other, the likelihood

of disengagement diminishes.

The following figure visually illustrates how the variables included in this study are interrelated with each other.

Figure 2.2
AN INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL



The comprehensive interaction effects explanatory model offered here could be expressed in the following way:

$$Y = a + b_1(HC) + b_2(DEP) + b_3(DC) + b_4(WSP) + b_5(HC*DEP) + b_6(DEF$$

$b_7(GD)$

where:

HC = hegemonic capability

DEP= dependency

DC = domestic capability of peripheral country

WSP = World System position

GD = geographic distance

CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODS

RESEARCH DESIGN

The focus of this dissertation is on the analysis of disengaging foreign policy behavior of Latin American nations vis a vis the United States during the 1948-1983 period. Empirical results of the statistical analysis are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Each of them report results of one of the two major goals attempted by this study.

The first goal, merely descriptive, attempts to empirically identify the presence of patterns of disengagement from the United States in the behavior of Latin American countries. For this purpose, twenty Latin American countries were analyzed individually as well as aggregated as a region, on a longitudinal basis, when identifying trends of foreign policy disengagement from the United States. Measurements on three dimensions --political, economic and diplomatic-- of foreign policy behavior were developed to explore patterns of disengagement of Latin American nations¹. The twenty countries included in this study were: -

¹ In the process of systematizing empirical information one is faced with the problem of reducing variables to measures. In an attempt to systematize the concepts and measures most commonly used in the study of foreign policy

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The second goal, was to empirically test the different theoretical explanations analyzed in Chapter 2 via the utilization of a covariance analysis model that uses panel data². The specific statistical model utilized for the analysis is a random effects pooled time-series cross-section model that assumes autocorrelation and spatial correlation. The specific characteristics of such a model are explained, in detail, further in this chapter.

Chapter 3 is divided in three main parts. The first one presents the operationalization of variables involved in the study. The second one presents the criteria utilized to determine whether the foreign policy behavior of Latin American countries between 1948-1983 showed patterns that

Linda P. Brady [1982: 23] proposes that measures should meet four criteria to be acceptable: 1) they must be based on rigorous, a priori conceptualization; 2) they must be theoretically significant or policy relevant; 3) they must facilitate comparison; 4) and collectively they must represent the diversity of foreign policy activities and the rich body of concepts used in traditional, non quantitative scholarship. It is the intention of this research to work within the context of these criteria.

² For further details of the analysis of this data see Cheng Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data, Econometric Society Monographs No. 11, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

indicate disengagement from the United States. The third, and last part, presents the characteristics of the statistical model utilized to perform the explanatory analysis.

3.1. PART I: OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES

The data set utilized for the statistical analysis of foreign policy disengagement performed in this dissertation incorporates thirty six yearly measurements (1948-1983) for each variable for each country (twenty countries). This means that the n for the overall model is 720. The variables were operationalized in the following way:

3.1.1. Measurements of Disengagement

Disengagement was operationalized as distance from United States recorded in three dimensions of foreign policy behavior of Latin American countries. The three dimensions in question are: Economic (ECON), Political (POL), and Diplomatic (DIPL).

I. Economic Distance (ECON): Measured as concentration of Imports from non-U.S. suppliers.

Operationalization:

$$ECON = 1 - \frac{IUS}{TI}$$

where:

IUS = Total yearly imports from U.S.
 TI = Total yearly imports.

This measurement would yield the willingness of the government of a country to replace the United States as a major supplier for their imports. This indicator was chosen as a significant one following the argument presented by Volgy and Kenski [1976: 148] to the effect that governments have greater degrees of freedom in terms of the imports they are willing to accept while they can be much less discriminating when it comes to exports. Data to construct this measurement was extracted from the United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook. Trade by Country, Vols. from 1950-1985.

II. Political Distance (POL): Measured as opposition to United States in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

A measurement of the organizational behavior of dependent nations is absolutely essential for an assessment of their patterns of foreign policy implementation. Performance at the General Assembly level may not be

considered very important or meaningful in the case of large nations. Big powers tend to solve their differences at the Security Council level or at the international courts. The General Assembly, however, is the forum where minor nations ventilate their differences. And the use of that forum to express their concerns is, in itself, a definition of a political position.

Furthermore, in the case of Latin American nations, and in general all countries whose legal systems come from the Roman tradition, formal institutional activity holds an enormous importance. While in the common law tradition "custom" is the major source of law, in the Roman tradition "codification" is. Therefore, participation in the codification effort of international rules is seen as tremendously important by such nations.

Operationalization³:

$$POL = \frac{\left(\frac{2(O) + D}{TV} \right)}{1.6}$$

³ Note that all scores were divided by 1.6 for normalization purposes (the highest value obtained was 1.57). This was necessary because, since votes opposite to the United States were weighted, the resulting ratios could be larger than 1.

where:

O = Yearly number of votes opposite⁴ to the United States position in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

D = Yearly number of votes different to the United States in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

TV = Yearly total number of votes issued in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Arendt Lijphart introduced, in 1963, a measurement for compliance utilizing U.N. General Assembly data⁵. Lijphart's index of political compliance using U.N. General Assembly data reads as follows:

$$IA = \frac{\frac{f + 1}{2q}}{t}$$

⁴ Votes that differ from the United States position were classified into opposite and different to better reflect the political dynamics of dependent countries in the United Nations. It is well known that highly dependent nations tend to rely on the use of abstentions and absences to express disagreement with the political position of their mentor but not wanting to risk retaliatory punishment. It was considered that openly voting against the U.S. position was a much greater political statement than absenteeism or abstentionism. For this reason an open disagreement was weighted double in value than other behaviors that appear to be different than the U.S.

⁵ Arendt Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly" in American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, 1963, pp. 902-917.

where f = the number of votes on which the pair agrees, g = the number of votes on which the pair partially agrees, and t = the number of votes on which the pair voted. Lijphart measurement and the index presented here share a common measuring principle. The basic difference is that each index is measuring an opposite end of the same continuum. Lijphart's measures compliance and the one used here measures disagreement.

The source of this data is the United Nations General Assembly Plenary Voting Data.

III. Diplomatic Distance (DIPL).- Treaty activity with the United States as a share of total treaty activity.

Operationalization:

$$DIPL = \frac{\Sigma TUS_{45}}{\Sigma TT_{45}}$$

where:

ΣTUS = Sum of yearly number of bilateral treaties signed with the United States starting in 1945.

ΣTT = Sum of yearly total number of bilateral treaties signed starting in 1945.

This is a cumulative indicator that measures treaty activity in the post World War II period. A sum of the yearly scores was used to construct the ratio of activity since the effects of a treaty remain in operation during the following years after their signature. The base line point to start the accumulation was 1945. The relevance of this measurement is that the signature of a particular treaty reflects the willingness of a country to engage in long term commitment with the other country. Signing a treaty is usually a long and bureaucratic process which allows room for second thoughts, thus signing it usually implies a true commitment. Once being signed it stays in operation for a number of years. For these reasons, treaty activity was considered a valuable measurement of commitment. It is important to note, however, that although it is a valuable indicator, its use is not free of trouble since it is a fact that some treaties become irrelevant as time goes on, some others go out of existence and others are rescinded. Nevertheless, not without problems, it is an indicator that provides a good idea of the formal patterns that develop over time in the diplomatic relationship between countries. Data to construct this indicator was obtained from Rohn, Peter H. World Treaty Index.

3.1.2. Explanatory Variables

MODEL 1: Hegemonic Capabilities (HC).- measured as United States share of global resources in two dimensions: economic and military.

A. Hegemonic economic capabilities (HEC).- U.S. Share of Global Economic Capabilities.

Operationalized as:

$$HEC = \frac{US\ GDP}{World\ GDP}$$

where:

U.S. GDP = Yearly gross domestic product/pc * population of the United States at constant 1985 prices adjusting for purchasing power parity (as presented by Summers and Heston 1991).

World GDP = Sum of Yearly gross domestic products/pc * population of all countries at constant 1985 prices adjusting for purchasing power parity (as presented by Summers and Heston 1991).

The economic share of world capabilities has been used before by a number of scholars as a common measurement of hegemonic capabilities [Goldstein 1988; Small and Singer 1982]. Rupert and Rapkin present [1985] a similar measurement but they only concentrate on the U.S. share of the product of the major seven nations in the system. However, these seven nations take such a large percentage of the total that it

could be argued that both measurements reflect the same phenomenon.

The measurement used here takes into consideration the purchasing power parity factor in addition to the raw share of the global product in dollars. The reasoning for it is that such an indicator best reflects the true capabilities of a nation. The capability units that a dollar may be able to buy, changes across societies and also across time. For this reason it is important to have such a factor into consideration.

Data for this measurement was obtained from Summers, Robert and Alan Heston PWT5 data set. Documentation for this data set was published as "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988" in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1991, pp. 327-368.

B. Hegemonic military capabilities (HMC).- U.S. Share of Global Military Capabilities.

Operationalized as:

$$HMC = \frac{US\ MilExp}{World\ MilExp}$$

where:

U.S. MilExp = Yearly military expenditures for the U.S.

World MilExp= Yearly world military expenditures.

This is also a straight forward standardly used measure of hegemonic capabilities [Goldstein 1988, Spiezio 1990; Small and Singer 1982]. Data for this measure⁶ was obtained from SIPRI Yearbook. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973-1990

MODEL 2: Dependency on the United States.- measured at three levels:

Economic Dependency (EcoD), Political Dependency (PolD), and Military Dependency (MilD).

A. Economic Dependency (EcoD).- Measured as concentration of exports sold to the United States.

Operationalization:

$$EcoD = \frac{EUS}{TE}$$

⁶ The Correlates of War National Capabilities Archive Data Set also has this measurement available.

where:

EUS = Yearly total exports to the United States.

TE = Yearly total exports.

This measurement clearly indicates to what extent each one of the countries under study have to depend on the United States willingness to purchase the commodities they export. It is a clear indicator of economic vulnerability. The source of this data is the United Nations International Trade Statistics Yearbook. Trade by Country, 1950-1985.

B. Governmental Dependency (GovD): Dependency on the United States as a source of income for governmental expenditures.

Operationalization

$$GovD = \frac{AUS}{GEX}$$

where:

AUS = Total Aid (Grants and Loans) received from the United States during each fiscal year.

GEX = Yearly Government Expenditures.

This measurement clearly indicates how much of the money spent in one year by the government of one country came directly from the government of the United States in the form

on grants or loans. It is a clear measurement of governmental vulnerability to the desires of the U.S. government. It is well known that a number of Latin American governments relied on American money to support themselves and maintain internal political stability⁷. U.S. Grants and Loans data utilized to construct this measurement was taken from Christof Anders Weber, "Announced U.S. Assistance to Latin America, 1946-88: Who Gets It? How Much? And When?" in Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 28, 1990. Government expenditures data was collected from SALA, several volumes.

C. Military Dependency (MILD): Dependency on the United States as a source of income for military expenditures.

Operationalization:

$$MILD = \frac{MA}{ME}$$

where:

MA = Military Aid received from the United States during each year.

ME = Total yearly military expenditures.

⁷ See Charles F. Doran, "U.S. Foreign Aid and the Unstable Polity: A Regional Case Study" in Orbis, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 1978.

This measurement provides a clear idea of how much of the total military expenditures of one country comes directly from the United States. It is particularly relevant in the case of military governments --a majority in Latin America during the 1960-1980 period. It is important to mention that since the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, military aid has been one of the favorite mechanisms for political control used by the United States in the Latin American region⁸. Data required to compute the measurement of military dependency was collected from: SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1973-1981 and Christof Anders Weber, "Announced U.S. Assistance to Latin America, 1946-88: Who Gets It? How Much? And When?" in Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 28, 1990.

MODEL 3: National Attributes.

A. National Resources (NR)..- operationalized as size of the economy. It was measured by Gross Domestic Product at constant prices of 1985 controlling for purchasing power parity.

⁸ See Edward N. Muller. "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World" in International Studies Quarterly, 29, 1985, pp. 445-469.

A large diversity of measurements of national capabilities and resources have been presented in previous studies. Gross National Product (GNP) has been one of the most common of all⁹. In general, the total size of the economy has been considered a good indicator of the total amount of resources that a country can count on. The author was inclined, however, to use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) instead of GNP because the former provides an idea of the general growth of the economy regardless of the national source of the capital that sponsored it. This is particularly important in the case of dependent countries since foreign investment is a major sponsor of industrialization projects.

The data utilized to measure the national resources variable comes from the Summers and Heston data base available in disk form, whose documentation has been published as "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988" in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1991. The main virtue of their measurement is that it takes into consideration GDP at

⁹ Organski and Kugler in The War Ledger [1990: 85] present a measurement of national capabilities that multiplies GNP/pc by population by extraction effort. They also present another measurement developed by Organski and Davis that is basically reduced to GNP as the result of multiplying population by GNP/pc [p.34]. Singer, Bremer and Stuckey [1972: 19-26] define capabilities utilizing a distribution in percentages of the total capabilities of existing relevant nations in the system at three levels: industrial, military and demographic capacities.

constant 1985 prices but it also takes into consideration purchasing power parity. This indicator could reflect better the true capabilities that a certain amount of resources can buy within the specific context of a particular economy.

A comparison was made of Summers and Heston's real GDP [1985 international prices; chain index] and GDP at constant 1970 prices for 4 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The results of such comparison suggest that the power of purchase of the dollar has increased in a steady manner for all four Latin American nations. The implications of this fact indicate that in spite of the relatively low growth of their economies, Latin American countries actually count with more resources than what would be reflected by a simple dollar figure. The nature of their monetary structures could very well give them a monetary advantage that additionally increases their national capabilities since their dollars go further in their purchasing power than the dollars in the U.S. or other core nations. A pure look at GDP would not record this phenomenon.

B. Domestic Instability (DI).— An index of domestic instability was constructed in the following way:

Operationalization:

$$DI = AA + R$$

where:

AA = yearly number of armed attack incidents recorded

R = yearly number of riot incidents recorded

Data for this measurement was extracted from the World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators (version 3 in tape form).

C. Approximate Government Competence (AGC).- An approximate indicator of government incompetence was constructed from the interaction of the previous two national attribute variables. This way, the operationalization of this indicator reads:

$$AGC = \frac{NR}{DI}$$

where:

AGC = Approximate Government Competence
 NR = National Resources
 DI = Domestic Instability

The justification for the inclusion of this variable lies on the theoretical argument that states that the existence of abundant resources in a particular country is not necessarily a measurement of its national capabilities. Under this argument one can only talk about capabilities when those resources are accessible to the government. On the

other hand the indicator of political instability reflect the capacity of the government to control society. The interaction of these two variables would then reflect the approximate level of competence of the government.

MODEL 4: Position in the World-System.

The relative position within the World System, that each of the twenty countries occupies at each point in time, was operationalized by adopting the classification that Smith and White present in their 1992 study. Such classification is the product of the analysis of the content of the export flows of each country. Four major classes of countries are distinguished according to this typology:

- A. core.- countries that mainly export sophisticated high technology, high value added products.
- B. semiperiphery I.- countries that export manufactured goods that require a medium level of sophistication and have medium high value added.
- C. semiperiphery II.- countries that export light manufactured goods with medium levels of value added.
- D. periphery.- countries that specialize in exporting

raw materials, agricultural goods or extractive mining products characterized by having the lowest value added.

Two dummy variables were constructed to reflect the above classification. The first one, where 1 = country with semiperiphery I status in a particular year, 0 otherwise. The second one, where 1 = semiperiphery II status in a particular year, 0 otherwise. The combination of two zeros was left to account for countries having periphery status in that particular year. In such a case the coefficient would be reflected in the intercept.

Data to construct this measurement for 14 of the 20 countries in the study was found in David A. Smith and Douglas R. White, "Structure and Dynamics of the Global Economy: Network Analysis of International Trade, 1965-1980", mimeo, 1992. Smith and White failed to include Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Chile and Argentina. To classify such countries an analysis of the value added composition of their 20 principal products exported was performed for each country for the years 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980. The analysis was also performed for Peru and Brazil, two countries analyzed by Smith and White [1992] and the classification obtained was similar to theirs. For this reason it was considered appropriate to complete their information with the one obtained by this procedure. Data on the products exported

was extracted from the U.N. International Trade Statistics Yearbook. Trade by Commodity, 1950-1985, and the value added content of the products was determined according to the U.S. Standard Identification Code (SIC) reported by the Economic Census 1982, published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

MODEL 6: Geographic Distance.

A measurement of geographic distance from Washington to each one of the capital cities of the twenty countries was recorded. Operationalization of this variable consists of the number of kilometers, in direct line, that separates Washington from each capital city. Source for this measurement can be found in Gary L. Fitzpatrick and Marilyn J. Modlin Direct-Line Distances. International Edition. Metuchen, N.J. and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1986.

3.2. PART II: IDENTIFICATION OF SECULAR TRENDS OF FOREIGN POLICY DISENGAGEMENT.

As mentioned earlier, on a first instance, it is intended to detect the presence of disengagement in the foreign policy behavior of Latin American nations vis a vis the United States during the 1948-83 time framework. - Disengagement¹⁰ was operationally defined as the presence of linear trends as determined by the standard method utilized in times series analysis. This is to say that, foreign policy disengagement was accepted to be existent if the series presented, for each indicator for each country, showed a clear linear trend and the slope was positive. This procedure was executed for each of the three indicators that measure distancing of Latin American countries from the United States during the 1948-1983¹¹. Each one of these indicators corresponds to three different dimensions of foreign policy behavior --political, economic, and diplomatic-- as explained earlier in this chapter.

¹⁰ Foreign policy disengagement was defined earlier as normal foreign policy change as used by Holsti [1982a]. This is to say a slow, incremental, evolutionary process of increasing distance that takes place during a long period of time.

¹¹ As for calibration, the sensitivity of our measures to changes in foreign policy can be verified by eyeballing the graphs included in Appendixes A, B, C and D. Since every indicator was plotted for each country it is relatively easy to do. The graphs were checked for Guatemala 1954, Cuba 1959-, Chile 1973, Nicaragua 1979, Dominican Republic 1965.

3.2.1. Statistical procedures for identification of trends of disengagement.

a. Testing behavior of individual countries:

As indicated by the standard methods utilized to identify linear trends¹² when analyzing time series data, yearly measurements of all three dimensions were gathered for each one of the twenty countries and regressed individually --per country-- against the year of occurrence utilizing the following equation:

$$DISTANCE = a + b (Year)$$

¹² The data was treated, also, for identification of non linear trends. Spectral analysis and serial correlation analysis were used for such treatment in all three indicators for all twenty countries. The results were graphed to produce correlograms. Correlograms are a good support source to determine periodicity and in conjunction with the spectral analysis results allow for the development of polynomials that enable forecasting. However, the results obtained when these procedures were used showed that the limited number of time points in the series did not allowed to use these procedures in a meaningful way. Thirty six points in time is too short of a time series given the nature of the data. For this reason the results obtained on non linear patterns are not included in this dissertation. Nevertheless, the author would like to express her gratitude to Mariano Hernandez for his advise on this issue and also for allowing the use of his software named "Trends" to execute such procedures.

where distance is measured in three dimensions: economic, political, and diplomatic.

b. Testing aggregated regional behavior

On a second instance, the same procedure mentioned above to detect linear trends was executed for the aggregate of the twenty countries. The aggregated score, of each indicator, for the whole region was calculated by using the arithmetic mean of the yearly scores of the twenty countries.

c. Specification guidelines for detecting foreign policy disengagement.

Verifying the following theses was the guiding line of the descriptive part of this dissertation and results are reported in Chapter 4:

- T_{1a}: Disengagement took place in every Latin American country vis a vis the United States during the 1948-83 period.
- T_{1b}: The whole Latin American region underwent a process of disengagement from the United States during the 1948-83 period.

The conditions to determine the existence of secular linear trends in distancing from the United States were given by the sign of the expected coefficient (positive indicates

increase in distance, negative decrease in distance) and the strength of the correlation coefficient. An r of 0.700¹³ or greater was considered significant. In other words, in order to accept the existence of secular trends indicating distancing (or disengagement) the regression results had to show a positive "b" and an r equal or greater than 0.700.

The tests were run individually per country for all three indicators and also aggregated for the region. Regional aggregate was done utilizing the arithmetic mean of all twenty individual country scores per year.

3.3. PART III: EXPLAINING LATIN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT

Once the trends of foreign policy distancing from the United States were established, for all twenty countries, as well as for the entire region, the second step was to test a series of hypotheses that led to explain such an outcome. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are four major contending explanations, derived from the literature available, that serve as a foundation for this research. The first of them focusses on hegemonic decline of the United States as the

¹³ As reflected in the literature for social sciences, a correlation coefficient of 0.700 is usually considered highly significant. For that reason such number was selected to be the minimum acceptable standard.

major explanatory variable of foreign policy disengagement. - The second school of thought reviewed here is the Dependency approach that hypothesize that disengagement occurs as a negative function of dependency. The third explanation, based on the modernization and national attributes theories, relies on the increase of the domestic capabilities of countries as the major explanatory variable. The fourth one, is derived from the World Systems theory and states that the distancing of countries from their hegemon would be a function of the relative position that they occupy within the global division of labor. Finally, a couple of alternative explanations that integrate the previous approaches are presented to be tested.

3.3.1. Hypotheses

The hypotheses guiding part two of this research read as follows:

- H₁: Disengagement is a function of decay in the hegemonic share of global capabilities.
- H₂: Disengagement takes place as an inverse function of dependency.
- H₃: Disengagement occurs as a function of growth in the domestic capabilities of a country. This is to say growth in its availability of resources plus increased political stability and greater government competence.
- H₄: Disengagement is less likely to occur in semiperiphery I status countries than in peripheral countries or semiperiphery II status countries.

H₅: Disengagement is a function of the combination of all ~~for~~ elements introduced in H₁ through H₄.

H₆: Disengagement is a function of all elements present in H₄ plus the interactions of hegemonic decline with dependency, dependency with national resources plus geographic distance.

Two indicators of hegemonic decline were utilized to account for differences in the effects of military and economic relative capabilities of the hegemon on the disengaging behavior of Latin America.

Two measurements of dependency were constructed --one economic and another one military--to account for differences in the effects that each one of these two types of dependency may have in the foreign policy behavior of nations.

A measurement of national resources was included to explain the effects of the dynamics of domestic growth on the foreign policy behavior of nations. An indicator of domestic stability was also included as part of the national capability set, and finally, an interaction variable that provides an approximation to government competence is included. The combination of these three variables should reflect the capability of a particular administration to mobilize its national resources.

3.3.2. The Model¹⁴

To model the relationship between a dependent variable and the explanatory variables over time and across countries, a pooled time-series cross-section analysis model is used. Many approaches to the analysis of panel data have been proposed (see Hsiao, 1986). In this analysis (see Kmenta 1986, Chapter 12), the general model used has the form:

$$Y_{it} = \underline{B}'\underline{X}_{it} + E_{it}$$

where Y_{it} is the value of the dependent variable in the (i)th country at the (t)th time period, $i = 1, \dots, I$, $t = 1, \dots, T$, \underline{X}_{it} is the $K \times 1$ column vector, with first element 1, and other elements given by the values of the explanatory variables in the (i)th country at time t, \underline{B}' is a $1 \times K$ row vector of parameters whose first element corresponds to an intercept, and E_{it} is the disturbance at time t in country i. Each disturbance is assumed to have a mean of 0.

The model is completed by specifying the covariance structure of the disturbances. Here, the disturbance is the

¹⁴ I would like to express my gratitude to Michael E. Sobel from the Department of Sociology at the University of Arizona for helping me with the statistical work involved in this dissertation and also with the proper writing of this section.

sum of two components:

$$E_{it} = p_i E_{i,t-1} + u_{it},$$

where

- a.) for each i , u_{it} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables with common variance ϕ_{ii} ;
- b.) u_{it} and u_{js} are independent if $t \neq s$, and if $t = s$, covariance $(u_{it}, u_{jt}) = \phi_{ij}$;
- c.) u_{jt} and $E_{i,t-1}$ are independent for all i and j ;
- d.) E_{it} has variance $\phi_{ii}/(1-p_i^2)$ and covariance $(E_{it}, E_{jt}) = \phi_{ij}/(1 - p_i p_j)$.

Equation (2) states that the disturbances follow an autoregressive (AR-1) process, with an autocorrelation of p_i . Note that the autocorrelation is allowed to be different in different countries. It is assumed the process is stationary and that the process has been operating for a sufficiently long time prior to the initial time point (see assumption d above).

Assumption b allows for correlation between u_{it} and u_{jt} ; as a consequence, E_{it} and E_{jt} are correlated, with covariance $\sigma_{ij} = \phi_{ij}/(1 - p_i p_j)$ (see d above). Thus, the model accommodates, in addition to autocorrelation, a flexible pattern of spatial correlation (correlation across countries).

Finally, note that under the model, the variance of E_{it} is $\sigma_{ii} = \phi_{ii}/(1-p_i^2)$ (see d above). This means that the disturbances are homoskedastic within countries, but heteroskedastic across countries. The covariance between E_{it} and $E_{i,t-s}$ is $p_i^{t-s}\sigma_{ii}$ where $t > s$, and the covariance between E_{it} and $E_{j,t-s}$ is $p_i^{t-s}\sigma_{ij}$, where $t > s$. This completes the specification of the covariance matrix of the disturbances.

If the parameters of the covariance matrix of the disturbances were known, B could be estimated by using the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator. Under general conditions (which are satisfied in this study), the GLS estimator has desirable asymptotic properties (as the number of time periods increases); in particular, the estimate is consistent and asymptotically normal, thereby justifying the usual types of statistical tests associated with regression models (t tests and F tests). However, in the case at hand, the parameters in question are unknown and must be estimated from the data. This is accomplished by applying ordinary least squares to equation (1) and estimating the parameters for the covariance matrix of the disturbances from the residuals of the ordinary least squares regression. See Kmenta (1986; pages 623-624) for further details. These estimates are then used in place of the actual parameters to compute an approximate GLS estimator of B . This procedure, known as feasible GLS (FGLS), yields estimates with the same

desirable properties as the GLS estimator. Hence, analogously to ordinary regression, the ratio of the FGLS parameter estimate to the FGLS standard error of the parameter can be used, in conjunction with the t distribution, to test the null hypothesis that the parameter of the model is zero. To test hypotheses on more than one parameter, either F tests, pseudo-likelihood ratio tests, score tests or Wald type tests can be utilized. (For further material on likelihood ratio tests, score (or Lagrange multiplier) test, and Wald tests, see the review article by Engle (1984). In this study, a Wald type test is utilized to test the simultaneous null hypothesis that a subset of the model parameters all have the value zero. The null hypothesis can be expressed as:

$$R\hat{\beta} = 0$$

where R is a known $p \times K$ matrix of full row rank, with p equal to the number of hypotheses under consideration. The test statistic is then given as:

$$W = (R\hat{\beta})' (R\hat{V}(\hat{\beta})R')^{-1} (R\hat{\beta}),$$

where

$\hat{V}(\hat{\beta})$ is the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix of $\hat{\beta}$. Under the null hypothesis, W follows a χ^2 distribution with p degrees of freedom.

The FGLS estimator for the model described above is implemented in the pooled cross-section time-series module of the software program SHAZAM (White, Wong, Whistler, and Haun 1990) which was used to estimate the models herein. The Wald type test (which is not implemented in the normal module) was programmed¹⁵ using the matrix language capacities of SHAZAM. The results obtained from the utilization of cross-section time-series analysis are reported in Chapter 5.

The three different dimensions of foreign policy behavior included here were treated separately as opposed to having been collapsed in an index. The construction of such an index was considered inappropriate since it would have hidden all variability across the three measurements of the dependent variable. The model was, then, ran separately for each measure of the dependent variable (foreign policy disengagement) and the results are reported separately.

To determine the significance of the overall model for each instance an F statistic and a Wald type test score are reported. To determine the relevancy of the model both the Buse R^2 and an R^2 were reported. Regarding this last point, it is important to note that one of the limitations of the

¹⁵ The computer program necessary to execute the Wald type test was written by William Dixon based on Robert F. Engle, "Wald, Likelihood Ratio and Lag range multiplier test in Econometrics" in Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 2 Zvi Griliches and Michael Intriligator (eds), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1984.

random effects time-series cross-section analysis model is that it is impossible to determine the percentage of the variance explained by the model vis a vis the original data¹⁶. Since the data are transformed to eliminate autocorrelation and spacial correlation, a Buse R^2 ¹⁷ is utilized instead to determine the percentage of the variance explained by the model after the transformation of the data has occurred. Also, a regular R^2 is reported. It is important to note, however, that such an R^2 is only telling the square of the correlation coefficient of the original data. It does not reflect the percentage of the variance explained.

The transformation of the data to correct for autocorrelation and spatial correlation brings some other troublesome characteristics to the analysis. The F statistic, for example, enables to determine how significant the model is but does not enable comparison across models, since the metric will be different for different models once the data has been transformed . The reason for this is that the transformation changes the metric of the data. Such a change in the metric carries on some problems, for example, regular

¹⁶ See Judge, G. W. Grriffiths, R. Hill, H. Lütkepohl and T. Lee, The Theory and Practice of Econometrics, Wiley, 2nd ed., 1985, pp. 29-35.

¹⁷ See Buse, A. "Goodness-of-Fit in the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model. A Generalization" in Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 10, 1979, pp. 109-113.

F test to compare models cannot be used because the analysis of variance results are affected by the different metric problem. This is why the option of a Wald type test seemed to be the most appropriate.

The results reported in Chapter 5 also include T ratios to determine the significance of each individual variable, and Wald type tests to determine the significance of the different subsets of variables that compose the approaches into consideration. The variables in such subsets are grouped in the following way:

Hegemony: Hegemonic economic capabilities (HE)
Hegemonic military capabilities (HM)

Dependency: Economic dependency (ED)
Governmental dependency (GD)
Military dependency (MI)

National Capabilities: Size of the Economy (SE)
Political Instability (PI)
Government Competence (GC)

Position in the World System: Semiperiphery I status
Semiperiphery II status

Geographic location: Geographic distance from Washington

Interaction (Hegemony Dependency): HE*ED
HM*ED
HE*GV
HM*GV
HE*MI
HM*MI

Interaction (Dependency National Resources): SE*ED
SE*GV
SE*MI

CHAPTER 4
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS ON DISENGAGEMENT

The purpose of this chapter is to identify secular trends of Latin American disengagement from the United States. Trends of economic, political, and diplomatic disengagement were traced for twenty Latin American countries from 1946-1949 until 1979-84¹. The countries included in this study are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

The yearly scores of two --economic and political-- of the three indicators showed a solid linear function that identifies Latin American disengagement from the United States in nineteen out of twenty countries. The results of the third indicator --diplomatic distance-- showed support in thirteen out of twenty countries. In conclusion, the results

¹ Starting and finishing points of the time series differ across indicators. The series for trade encompass a larger number of years than the one on treaties. All years available are included for the descriptive part of the analysis. That is not the case however in the explanatory part since time-series cross-section analysis does not allow missing data.

presented here empirically support the thesis that Latin America has been disengaging from the United States during the last few decades.

4.1. IDENTIFICATION OF SECULAR TRENDS OF LATIN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT.

4.1.1. Results for individual countries

a. Economic disengagement:

The guiding thesis T_1 :

T_1 : Disengagement took place in every Latin American country vis a vis the United States during the 1946/48-1979/84 period.

was accepted² for the cases of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. It was rejected for Argentina. The available data on Haiti was insufficient to

² Just a reminder that the criteria for acceptability was the standardly used in time series analysis to detect linear trends. In this case it came out to be the presence of a clear linear trend with a positive slope and a correlation coefficient equal or greater than 0.700. For further details see Chapter 3 "Identification of Trends of Disengagement".

provide regression results, but the graphic results provided in Appendix A, Graph 12 support T_1 . As can be observed, in Table 4.1 and Graphs 1 through 20 (Appendix A), the thesis of Latin American economic disengagement from the United States is supported for nineteen out of twenty countries.

Table 4.1.

**ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT
Regression Results
Individual Countries**

Country	Time period	Regression Coefficient	Correlation Coefficient
Argentina	[1947-85]	0.001012	0.197
Bolivia *	[1948-84]	0.00645	0.780
Brazil *	[1947-84]	0.007325	0.825
Chile *	[1947-86]	0.008713	0.875
Colombia *	[1948-85]	0.010294	0.970
Costa Rica *	[1948-82]	0.011598	0.910
Cuba *	[1947-85]	0.02712	0.853
Dominican Rep *	[1948-85]	0.009055	0.852
Ecuador *	[1948-84]	0.00855	0.877
El Salvador *	[1948-83]	0.012756	0.906
Guatemala *	[1948-83]	0.013002	0.936
Haiti		N/A	N/A
Honduras *	[1948-84]	0.010938	0.915
Mexico *	[1948-84]	0.007086	0.889
Nicaragua *	[1948-82]	0.016507	0.981
Panama *	[1948-85]	0.01217	0.940

Paraguay	*	[1948-84]	0.005121	0.733
Peru	*	[1948-84]	0.00664	0.799
Uruguay	*	[1947-85]	0.006139	0.766
Venezuela	*	[1947-85]	0.007013	0.875

* acceptable linear trends

b. Political Disengagement:

The thesis of Latin American disengagement from the United States focussing on political participation in the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1946-1982 was accepted for the cases of Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru. That is to say six out of twenty countries. The thesis was rejected for Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. The regression results of this test can be observed in Table 4.2 and the graphic results in Graphs 21 through 40 (Appendix B).

Table 4.2

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT
Regression Results
Individual Countries

Country	Time period	Regression Coefficient	Correlation Coefficient
Argentina	[1946-82]	0.018414	0.659
Bolivia	[1946-82]	0.016132	0.694
Brazil *	[1946-82]	0.022721	0.777
Chile *	[1946-82]	0.017746	0.717
Colombia	[1946-82]	0.01578	0.575
Costa Rica *	[1946-82]	0.016958	0.737
Cuba	[1946-82]	0.025342	0.672
Dominican Rep *	[1946-82]	0.018099	0.745
Ecuador	[1946-82]	0.018918	0.676
El Salvador	[1946-82]	0.01351	0.555
Guatemala	[1946-82]	0.001841	0.097
Haiti	[1946-82]	0.008981	0.468
Honduras	[1946-82]	0.014416	0.635
Mexico	[1946-82]	0.013492	0.547
Nicaragua	[1946-82]	0.019622	0.671
Panama *	[1946-82]	0.020807	0.774
Paraguay	[1946-82]	0.012061	0.618
Peru *	[1946-82]	0.02438	0.815
Uruguay	[1946-82]	0.01448	0.641
Venezuela	[1946-82]	0.018741	0.698

* acceptable linear trends

A further examination of the graphic results of longitudinal trends offered in Graphs 21 through 40 (Appendix B), however, showed the necessity to run a separate test for the 1958-82 period. It is evident that 1958 marks the end of a period of compliance with the United States for all twenty Latin American countries. Graphs 21 through 40 (Appendix B) show that there is a clear change of political orientation vis a vis the United States for all Latin American countries after 1958. For this reason a further regression was run for all countries including only the 1958-82 period. Regression results for this test are presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3

**POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT
Regression Results
Individual Countries**

Countries		Time period	Regression Coefficient	Correlation Coefficient
Argentina	*	[1958-82]	0.040532	0.923
Bolivia	*	[1958-82]	0.028741	0.819
Brazil	*	[1958-82]	0.040081	0.927
Chile	*	[1958-82]	0.029509	0.841
Colombia	*	[1958-82]	0.037716	0.904
Costa Rica	*	[1958-82]	0.033683	0.907
Cuba		[1958-82]	0.007588	0.200
Dominican Rep	*	[1958-82]	0.032198	0.867
Ecuador	*	[1958-82]	0.03456	0.851

El Salvador	*	[1958-82]	0.034446	0.850
Guatemala	*	[1958-82]	0.021194	0.775
Haiti	*	[1958-82]	0.022962	0.760
Honduras	*	[1958-82]	0.031725	0.885
Mexico	*	[1958-82]	0.031065	0.806
Nicaragua	*	[1958-82]	0.037515	0.803
Panama	*	[1958-82]	0.03672	0.883
Paraguay	*	[1958-82]	0.024726	0.838
Peru	*	[1958-82]	0.042518	0.932
Uruguay	*	[1958-82]	0.030743	0.873
Venezuela	*	[1958-82]	0.030505	0.802

* acceptable linear trends

The regression results of political disengagement applicable to the 1958-82 period show that the thesis is accepted for all countries except Cuba. Cuban trends of behavior may be observed in Appendix B, Graph 27. It is clear that beginning in 1959 all Latin American nations --except Cuba, that disengaged radically in 1959-- have been slowly disengaging politically from the United States. This is true at least regarding their behavior in the United Nations.

c. Diplomatic Disengagement:

The thesis of Latin American disengagement from the United States focusing on treaty activity from 1948-1980 was accepted for the cases of Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. This is to say three out of twenty countries. The thesis was rejected for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. The regression results of this test can be observed in Table 4.4 and the graphic results in Appendix C, Graphs 41 through 60.

Table 4.4

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT
Regression Results
Individual Countries

Country	Time period	Regression Coefficient	Correlation Coefficient
Argentina *	[1948-79]	-0.00085	0.767
Bolivia	[1948-79]	0.000667	0.465
Brazil *	[1948-80]	0.000834	0.785
Chile	[1948-79]	0.000225	0.099
Colombia	[1948-79]	-0.00024	0.129
Costa Rica	[1948-79]	0.001511	0.649
Cuba *	[1948-80]	0.002323	0.772
Dominican Rep *	[1948-80]	-0.00275	0.921
Ecuador *	[1948-80]	0.002489	0.907

El Salvador	[1948-79]	-0.00014	0.047
Guatemala	[1948-79]	-0.00061	0.450
Haiti	[1948-79]	-0.00049	0.380
Honduras	[1948-79]	-0.00005	0.018
Mexico	[1948-79]	0.000322	0.327
Nicaragua	[1948-79]	-0.00167	0.407
Panama	[1948-79]	0.000384	0.131
Paraguay	[1948-79]	0.000890	0.625
Peru *	[1948-80]	0.002459	0.812
Uruguay	[1948-79]	-0.00126	0.660
Venezuela	[1948-79]	0.000711	0.468

* acceptable linear trends

A further examination of the graphic results of longitudinal trends offered in Graphs 41 through 60 (Appendix C), showed the necessity to run separate tests for different periods of time in different countries. It is evident from looking at the Graphs that there is a period of intense treaty activity with the United States in the early years of the post war. There is a tendency, however, in a majority of countries to distance later on in their treaty activity from the United States. 1956 marks a point of reorientation in the treaty activity of a number of these countries, but it is not applicable to all of them. For this reason separate tests were ran for the periods that appear to be significant given the graphic information that we have. Results of these tests are reported in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5
DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT
Regression Results
Individual Countries

Country	Time period	Regression Coefficient	Correlation Coefficient
Argentina *	[1963-79]	0.000485	0.860
Bolivia *	[1956-79]	0.001499	0.831
Brazil *	[1952-80]	0.001074	0.897
Chile *	[1962-79]	0.003178	0.880
Colombia *	[1956-79]	0.001524	0.812
Costa Rica *	[1951-79]	0.002113	0.803
Cuba *	[1956-80]	0.003049	0.899
Dominican Rep +	[1948-80]	-0.00275	0.921
Ecuador *	[1956-80]	0.003271	0.965
El Salvador *	[1955-79]	0.00189	0.873
Guatemala	[1948-79]	-0.00061	0.450
Haiti	[1948-79]	-0.00049	0.380
Honduras	[1956-79]	0.000689	0.272
Mexico *	[1954-68]	0.001870	0.900
Nicaragua	[1956-79]	0.001118	0.544
Panama *	[1952-79]	0.001801	0.807
Paraguay	[1948-79]	0.000890	0.625
Peru *	[1956-80]	0.004257	0.977
Uruguay *	[1962-79]	0.001154	0.941
Venezuela *	[1959-79]	0.002198	0.972

* acceptable linear trends

+ significant increase in closeness to the United States.

The correlation results of diplomatic disengagement applicable to the adjusted significant period of time for individual countries show that the thesis is accepted for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. It was rejected for Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. It is interesting to note that the Dominican Republic shows very strong increase in closeness toward the United States --a negative coefficient supported by a correlation coefficient of 0.921. It is also important to mention that the rejection of Paraguay appears to be borderline since it was rejected for having a correlation coefficient of 0.625. Having the standard been lower it would have been accepted. As a last point it is relevant to mention that all the other countries rejected are the ones that are geographically closest to the United States. This may explain partially their need to preserve an intense treaty activity with the U.S. deviating from the trend shown by the rest of the region for this indicator. In the case of Mexico, it shows a tendency toward disengagement during the period 1954-68. After that point the trend is toward an increase in closeness toward the U.S.

4.1.2. Aggregate regional results

Table 4.6 presents the aggregate regression results concerning the whole region treated as one unit. Visual results may be observed in Appendix D, Graphs 61, 62 and 63. As can be observed the thesis of Latin American regional disengagement:

T_2 : The whole Latin American region underwent a process of disengagement from the United States during 1946-1984.

is accepted for all three measurements of economic, political and diplomatic disengagement. In the case of political disengagement the thesis is accepted for both periods of time: 1946-82 and 1958-82.

Table 4.6
LATIN AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT
Aggregate Regression Results

All 20 countries

Dimension	Time period	Regression Coefficient	Correlation Coefficient
Economic *	[47-85]	0.0096	0.960
Political *	[46-82]	0.0166	0.736
*	[58-82]	0.0315	0.901
Diplomatic	[48-80]	0.0004	0.297
*	[56-80]	0.0013	0.871

* acceptable linear trends

4.2. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Table 4.7 presents the summary of the results obtained in this research for both T_1 and T_2 :

Table 4.7
Summary of Results
Disengagement thesis is accepted

Country	Economic	Political		Diplomatic	
	47-85	46-82	58-82	48-79	[adjusted]
Argentina	No	No	Yes	No	Yes [63-79]
Bolivia	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes [56-79]
Brazil	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes [52-80]
Chile	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes [62-79]
Colombia	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes [56-79]
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes [51-79]
Cuba	Yes	No	No	No	Yes [56-80]
Dominican Rep.	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No [48-80]
Ecuador	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes [56-80]
El Salvador	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes [55-79]
Guatemala	Yes	No	Yes	No	No [48-79]
Haiti	N/A	No	Yes	No	No [48-79]
Honduras	Yes	No	Yes	No	No [56-79]
Mexico	Yes	No	Yes	No	No [48-79]
Nicaragua	Yes	No	Yes	No	No [56-79]
Panama	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes [52-79]
Paraguay	Yes	No	Yes	No	No [48-79]
Peru	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes [56-80]
Uruguay	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes [62-79]
Venezuela	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes [59-79]
<hr/>					
Latin America	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes [56-79]

4.3. DISCUSSION

The results presented in this part of the study suggest empirical evidence to accept the thesis of Latin American foreign policy disengagement from the United States. Latin America --the traditional "backyard" of the United States-- as an aggregated region as much as a collection of individual countries --with a few exceptions-- appears to be engaged in a secular process of increased distancing vis a vis the United States during the 1946-1983 period.

When analyzing the previously presented results, one of the first ideas that come to mind is the need to explore the possibility that such process of increased distancing could be associated to the secular American hegemonic decline claimed to be occurring by a number of scholars.

In accordance with the literature on cycles of hegemony³, economic disengagement seems to precede the occurrence of political disengagement. Observed longitudinal trends for each Latin American country indicate that nineteen out of twenty countries have been economically disengaging from the United States since 1947. The political process of disengagement, on the other hand, did not start until 1959 as

³ For further details on the interrelation of economic and politico-military cycles of hegemony see Goldstein, Jeshua S. Long Cycles. Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

a generalized behavioral pattern for the entire region. Nevertheless, once it started, it has been a slow but steady process for nineteen out of twenty nations. The twentieth nation, Cuba, disengaged radically in 1959. The final result is that since 1959 twenty out of twenty countries show a clear tendency toward seeking greater political autonomy from the United States in their behavior expressed in the United Nations.

Regarding the process of diplomatic disengagement one can observe that different countries started their distancing from the United States at different points in time. Nevertheless, thirteen out of twenty countries show solid evidence of disengagement. Of the remaining seven, one --Paraguay-- presents only a marginal rejection, and another one --the Dominican Republic-- presents strong support for the opposite hypothesis --the one of decrease in distance. Five countries out of twenty show no clear trend. These countries are Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti. As can be noticed most of them are the closest to the United States in geographic distance. This could be an important element to explain the difficulties in disengaging in the treaty activity of these nations from the United States. The rest of the region, however, shows a clear trend of disengagement.

Once the pattern of Latin American disengagement has been identified , the next research step will be to explore the different possible explanations for such phenomenon.

CHAPTER 5**FINDINGS**

Chapter five presents the results obtained from performing the statistical analysis procedures described in Chapter 3. As a brief reminder, one could note that pooled time-series cross-section statistical analysis was performed to explain foreign policy disengagement --studied in three behavioral dimensions: economic disengagement, political disengagement and diplomatic disengagement.

Six different models, pertaining to different theoretical explanations, were tested and compared to explore the most accurate fit. Model one reflects the argument that less powerful countries disengage from their hegemon as the latter loses its relative power in the international system. Model two explores the veracity of the dependency approach that argues that, as countries decrease their levels of dependency, they will naturally seek greater foreign policy autonomy. Model three pertains to the national attribute theoretical tradition, and reflects the belief that as countries grow in their domestic capabilities and their governments become more competent at doing their job, they will naturally seek greater autonomy. Model four reflects the world system theoretical argument that explains disengagement as a function of the mobility in the world system. Model five


incorporates all the previously explained theories into an integrative model under the assumption that the best explanation will be the one that includes all of the above. Finally, model six is introduced as a more elaborate effort that builds on the initial idea of Model 5. Model six, called the interaction effects model, introduces a series of variables that express how the initial components of Model 5 are interrelated to each other. The main assumption behind this model is that the simple inclusion of all variables combined in Model 5 is not sufficient to obtain an accurate fit. It is necessary to incorporate the interrelation of some of these variables to best account for the outcome of foreign policy disengagement. Also, model six incorporates an additional variable, that seems to be relevant and is not considered under any of the previously reviewed theories, that is the geographic distance variable.

5.1. MODEL 1: HEGEMONIC DECLINE

The first model to analyze is the one that relies on hegemonic decline as the principal explanatory variable that accounts for explaining foreign policy disengagement. Visually the model looks as follows:

Figure 5.1

HEGEMONIC DECLINE



This model expects that disengagement will occur as the relative capabilities of the hegemon decrease vis a vis the total global capabilities available in the system. Statistical results for this model are summarized in the following tables.

a. Economic Disengagement

Results presented in table 5.1.a support the argument of Model 1 when it comes to Economic Disengagement. Both the F and Wald statistics indicate that the overall model is statistically significant. The Buse R^2 shows that 17 percent of the variance is explained by the model, once adjusted for autocorrelation while the regular R^2 indicates that the square of the correlation coefficient between the original data and the predicted is of 0.30.

TABLE 5.1.a

MODEL 1: HEGEMONIC DECLINE
Overall model significance
All countries 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.1719	0.30038	74.397	148.79	0.48935-32

* An F statistic of 6.908 is statistically significant at a 0.999 level with k1 = 2 and k2 > 120.
 ** A chi-square of 10.60 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 2 degrees of freedom.

It is important to note that given the t-ratio values presented in Table 5.1.b it could be argued that it is really the economic decline of capabilities which accounts to explain economic disengagement. The military capabilities variable showed no significance at this point.

TABLE 5.1.b

MODEL 1: HEGEMONIC DECLINE
(Economic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio 717 DF
Econ. Hegemony *	-1.3135	0.11379	-11.569
Mili. Hegemony	0.045023	0.066648	0.67723
Constant	0.97055	0.036551	26.553

* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 717 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at a 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

b. Political Disengagement

Tables 5.2.a and 5.2.b summarize the results obtained for political disengagement measured as voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly vis a vis the U.S. voting position.

TABLE 5.2.a

MODEL 1: HEGEMONIC DECLINE
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0523	0.33579	19.774	39.548	0.25833-08

* An F statistic of 6.908 is statistically significant at a 0.999 level with k1 = 2 and k2 > 120.
 ** In a chi-square table 10.60 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 2 degrees of freedom.

Table 5.2.a shows that the overall model is statistically significant as indicated by both the F and Wald statistics. The Buse R², however, shows that once adjusted for autocorrelation the overall model only explains 5 percent of the variance. So the model is significant but it is only marginally significant.

TABLE 5.2.b

MODEL 1: HEGEMONIC DECLINE
 (Political Disengagement)
 Significance of variables in the model
 All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio 717 DF
Econ. Hegem *	-1.9496	0.3420	-5.7006
Mili. Hegem	0.12538	0.22495	0.55738
Constant	0.99696	0.10089	9.8820

* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 717 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at a 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

On the other hand, Table 5.2.b indicates that it is the decline of economic capabilities that makes the overall model significant. Decline of military hegemonic capabilities appear to be insignificant when explaining political disengaging behavior.

c. Diplomatic Disengagement

Table 5.3.a indicate support regarding the significance of the overall model. The F and Wald statistics indicate significance. The Buse R^2 , however, tells that only 4 percent of the variance is accounted for once adjusted for autocorrelation. And the square of the correlation coefficient between the observed data and the predicted is

only 0.02. So the overall model is significant but marginally relevant when explaining diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.3.a

MODEL 1: HEGEMONIC DECLINE
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0442	0.0284	16.570	33.139	0.63659-07

* An F statistic of 6.908 is statistically significant at a 0.999 level with $k_1 = 2$ and $k_2 > 120$.

** In a chi-square table 10.60 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 2 degrees of freedom.

Table 5.3.b shows that the significance of the model is derived from the significance of the military hegemonic capabilities variable; exactly the opposite than in the previous two dimensions where the military variable was insignificant.

TABLE 5.3.b

MODEL 1: HEGEMONIC DECLINE
(Diplomatic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio 717 DF
Econ. Hegem	0.018179	0.019853	0.91569
Mili. Hegem *	-0.050837	0.0088546	-5.7414
Constant	0.88719	0.0069286	128.05


* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 717 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at a 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

5.2. MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY

The second model tested here explains disengagement as a negative function of the dependency relationship between the mentor and its satellites. Visually the model looks as follows:

Figure 5.2

DEPENDENCY



Model 2

Statistical results of testing Model 2 are presented in tables 5.4.a through 5.7.b.

a. Economic Disengagement

The following tables (5.4.a and 5.4.b) present the results of testing the effects of the dependency variables on economic disengagement:

TABLE 5.4.a

MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.3037	0.55129	104.106	312.32	0.21383-66

* An F statistic of 5.422 is statistically significant at 0.999 level with a k1 = 3 and k2 > 120.
 ** A chi-square of 12.84 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 3 degrees of freedom.

Results presented in Table 5.4.a indicate strong support for the overall dependency model when explaining economic disengagement. Both the F and the Wald statistics are strongly significant. The Buse R² indicates that dependency explains 30 percent of the variance once adjusted for autocorrelation and the square of the correlation coefficient between the observed data and the predicted is of 0.55.

TABLE 5.4.b

**MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY
(Economic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983**

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 716 DF
Economic Dependency *	-0.22257	0.01259	-17.67
Governmental + Dependency	0.016906	0.0075756	2.2317
Military Dependency	0.0011764	0.015207	0.0773
Constant	0.67536	0.0079573	84.873

* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 716 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

+ variables that show sign opposite than expected and are statistically significant.

Table 5.4.b, however, suggests that economic dependency is the major contributor to the high value of the F and Wald statistics. Since measurement of economic disengagement relies on imports, and measurement of economic dependency on exports, it was considered convenient to test the validity of the model excluding the economic dependency variable. The reason for this is that it is likely that a high correlation between imports and exports would exist due to pure commercial reasons not necessarily reflecting any conscious political intent of disengagement. Tables 5.5.a and b summarize the results of testing the model while excluding the economic dependency variable.

TABLE 5.5.a

MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY
(Excluding Economic Dependency)
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0055	0.00000	1.965	3.9291	0.14022

* An F statistic of 6.908 is statistically significant at a 0.999 level with k1 = 2 and k2 > 120.

** In a chi-square table 10.60 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 2 degrees of freedom.

Table 5.5.a indicates that, once the economic dependency variable is excluded from the equation, the dependency model loses all significance when explaining economic disengagement. As can be observed the Wald test value loses all significance, so does the F statistic. Also, both the R² and Buse R² are very close to zero.

TABLE 5.5.b

MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY
(Economic Disengagement)
(Excluding Economic Dependency)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 717 DF
Governmental + Dependency	0.010062	0.00513	1.9607
Military Dependency	0.0027898	0.011074	0.25194
Constant	0.54836	0.018993	28.871

* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 717 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

Furthermore, Table 5.5.b, shows that the governmental dependency variable is significant at the 0.005 level but its coefficient presents a positive sign when the expected sign of the model was negative.

b. Political Disengagement

Tables 5.6.a and 5.6.b present the statistical results of testing Model 2 for explaining political disengagement.

TABLE 5.6.a

MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0219	0.067058	5.336	16.009	0.1129-02

* An F statistic of 3.782 is significant at 0.99 level with a k1 = 3 and k2 > 120.

** In a chi-square distribution table 12.84 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 3 degrees of freedom.

Results reported in Tables 5.6.a and 5.6.b indicate support for the dependency argument when it comes to political disengagement. The overall model is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, although only the economic dependency variable is statistically significant when testing the individual significance of each variable (as expressed in Table 5.6.b). The low values of both R² scores indicate that

the model is significant but marginally relevant since it explains a very small percent of the variance.

TABLE 5.6.b

MODEL 3: DEPENDENCY
(Political Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 716 DF
Economic Dependency *	-0.072575	0.019306	-3.7591
Governmental Dependency	-0.010420	0.012562	-0.8295
Military Dependency	0.020008	0.029070	0.68827
Constant	0.46457	0.027294	17.021

* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 716 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

c. Diplomatic Disengagement

Tables 5.7.a and 5.7.b summarize the results obtained when testing Model 2 for explaining diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.7.a

MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.3106	0.29310	107.531	322.59	0.12765-68

* An F statistic of 5.422 is significant at 0.999 level with a k1 = 3 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square of 12.84 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 3 degrees of freedom.

The above presented results suggest strong support for the dependency argument when it comes to explain diplomatic disengagement. The Wald test and F statistic are strongly significant. The R² is of almost 0.3 while the Buse R², which measures the percentage of the variance explained of the transformed data, is of 0.31. This means that one third of the variance is being explained under Model 2 for diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.7.b

MODEL 2: DEPENDENCY
(Diplomatic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 716 DF
Economic Dependency *	-0.025124	0.0014444	-17.394
Governmental Dependency *	-0.0027980	0.00080034	-3.4960

Military Dependency *	-0.0064199	0.0023754	-2.7027
Constant	0.87829	0.001302	674.60

* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 716 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at 0.005 level on a two-tail test.


It is also important to notice that as Table 5.7.b indicates, all three measurements of dependency are statistically significant and the signs of their coefficients are negative as expected.

5.3. MODEL 3: NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

The third model to test relies on national capabilities variables to explain foreign policy disengagement. Visually the model looks as follows:

Figure 5.3

NATIONAL CAPABILITIES



Model 3

Tables 5.8.a through 5.10.b present the statistical analysis results of testing Model 3.

a. Economic Disengagement

The following two tables summarize the statistical results for testing Model 3 for economic disengagement.

TABLE 5.8.a

MODEL 3: NATIONAL CAPABILITIES
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0187	0.0029	4.555	13.665	0.33982-02

* An F statistic of 5.422 is significant at 0.999 level with a k1 = 3 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square of 12.84 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 3 degrees of freedom.

The results presented in Table 5.8.a indicate that the overall national capabilities model is marginally significant. The F statistic is only significant at the 0.005 level but not at the 0.001 level. The same is true for the Wald statistic. The values of both the Buse² and the R² are very close to zero. This indicates that almost no percentage of the variance is being explained. Therefore, the model is marginally significant and not very relevant.

TABLE 5.8.b

**MODEL 3: NATIONAL CAPABILITIES
(Economic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983**

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 716 DF
Size of the * Economy	0.0003450	0.0000970	3.5557
Political Instability	0.00002764	0.00003299	0.83802
Government Competence	-0.00003103	0.00002336	-1.3283
Constant	0.54411	0.025436	21.391

* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 716 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.8.b indicate that of the three variables that compose the model only size of the economy is statistically significant when explaining economic disengagement.

b. Political Disengagement

Tables 5.9.a and 5.9.b summarize the statistical results of testing Model 3 for political disengagement.

TABLE 5.9.a

MODEL 3: NATIONAL CAPABILITIES
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0687	0.0637	17.605	52.815	0.20075-10

* An F statistic of 5.422 is significant at 0.999 level with a k1 = 3 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square of 12.84 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 3 degrees of freedom.

Table 5.9.a indicates that the overall national capabilities model is statistically significant when explaining political disengagement as indicated by both the F and Wald statistics. The values of both Buse R² and R² tell that, although significant, the model is only marginally relevant since it is explaining only 6 percent of the variance once the original data has been adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation.

TABLE 5.9.b

MODEL 3: NATIONAL CAPABILITIES
(Political Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio 716 DF
Size of the * Economy	0.00051807	0.000089	5.8363
Political Instability	-0.00011304	0.0000801	-1.4114
Government Competence	0.00006931	0.0000559	1.2397
Constant	0.40449	0.021093	19.177

* variables that show the expected sign of the coefficient and are statistically significant. For 716 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

The t statistics presented in Table 5.9.b indicate that only size of the economy is a significant variable explaining political disengagement.

c. Diplomatic Disengagement

Tables 5.10.a and 5.10.b present the statistical results of the testing of Model 3 when explaining diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.10.a

MODEL 3: NATIONAL CAPABILITIES
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0627	0.0218	15.975	47.925	0.22096-09

* An F statistic of 5.422 is significant at 0.999 level with a k1 = 3 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square of 12.84 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 3 degrees of freedom.

Once again the results presented in tables 5.10.a and 5.10.b show a relative support for the national capabilities explanation. The overall model is significant for both the F and Wald statistics; the t statistic is only significant for the size of the economy variable; and both the Buse R² and the R² are very close to zero.

TABLE 5.10.b

MODEL 3: NATIONAL CAPABILITIES
(Diplomatic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio 715 DF
Size of the Economy *	0.00006031	0.0000091	6.6564
Political Instability	-0.0000042	0.0000042	-0.99598
Government Incompetence	-0.00000146	0.0000028	-0.52325

Constant	0.87586	0.00259	337.90
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* variables that show the expected sign and are statistically significant. For 716 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

In summary it could be said that of all the elements that constitute the national capabilities argument --in Model 3-- only the size of the economy is a significant explanatory variable of foreign policy disengagement. Also, it could be added that only a very small percent of the variance is being explained by it.


5.4. MODEL 4: CHANGE OF POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM

The fourth model tested here explores the effects of changes in the position of nations in the world system as the main explanatory variable accounting for disengaging behavior of nations. The model visually looks as follows:

Figure 5.4

RELATIVE POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM

Tables 5.11.a through 5.13.b present the statistical results of testing Model 4.

**Model 4**a. Economic disengagement

The following two tables summarize the results of testing the significance of the position in the world system variables when explaining economic disengagement.

TABLE 5.11.a

MODEL 4: POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse-R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0030	0.0079	1.069	2.1373	0.34347

* An F statistic of 6.908 is significant at 0.999 level with k1 = 2 and K2 > 120.

** A chi-square of 10.60 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 2 degrees of freedom.

TABLE 5.11.b

MODEL 4: POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
 (Economic Disengagement)
 Significance of variables in the model
 All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 717 DF*
Semiperiphery I	0.022599	0.020715	1.0909
Semiperiphery II	0.0075372	0.01505	0.50083
Constant	0.5513	0.021052	26.188

* For 717 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at a 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Results presented in Tables 5.11. a and 5.11.b show no support for the systemic position explanation when it comes to accounting for economic disengagement. All statistics appear to be nonsignificant.

b. Political disengagement

Tables 5.12.a and 5.12.b summarize the results obtained when testing the position in the world system variables to explain political disengagement.

TABLE 5.12.a

MODEL 4: POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0125	0.0208	4.541	9.0820	0.10663-01

* An F statistic of 6.908 is significant at 0.999 level with k1 = 2 and K2 = > 120.

** A chi-square of 10.60 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 2 degrees of freedom.

The above presented results indicate lack of support for the model that relies on the country's position in the world system as the principal explanation for political disengagement. The overall model is not significant at the 0.005 level as expressed by both the F and Wald statistics.

TABLE 5.12.b

MODEL 4: POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
(Political Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 717 DF
Semiperiphery I *	0.061745	0.020559	3.0033
Semiperiphery II	0.019687	0.015254	1.2906
Constant	0.41456	0.024175	17.148

* variables that show the expected sign of the coefficient and are statistically significant.
 For 717 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at a 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

The t ratios reported in Table 5.12.b indicate that countries located in the Semiperiphery I show a significant positive relationship between achieving such a status and disengaging. However, both R²s are too close to zero indicating that a too small share of the variance is being explained.

c. Diplomatic disengagement

Tables 5.13.a and 5.13.b present the statistical results of testing the significance of Model 4 when explaining diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.13.a

MODEL 4: POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0089	0.1129	3.232	6.4643	0.39472-01

* An F statistic of 6.908 is significant at 0.999 level with k1 = 2 and K2 = > 120.

** A chi-square of 10.60 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 2 degrees of freedom.

TABLE 5.13.b

MODEL 4: POSITION IN THE WORLD SYSTEM
 (Diplomatic Disengagement)
 Significance of variables in the model
 All countries, 1948-1983


Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 717 DF
Semiperiphery I *	0.0064693	0.00256	2.5311
Semiperiphery II	0.0027069	0.001795	1.5081
Constant	0.87310	0.003086	282.92

* variables that show the expected sign of the coefficient and are statistically significant.
 For 717 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at a 0.005 level on a two-tail test.
 + statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

Results presented in Tables 5.13.a and b show a lack of support for the position in the world system argument behind Model 4. The overall model for diplomatic disengagement is not statistically significant for either the F or Wald statistics. The reports on the t statistics indicate that there is a meaningful relationship between countries achieving Semiperiphery I status and diplomatic disengagement, however given the fact that both R²s appear to be too small, the impact of this variable on the overall behavior is very limited.

5.5.1. MODEL 5: AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL

Figure 5.5
INTEGRATIVE MODEL



Model 5

Figure 5.5 illustrates how the integrative model (Model 5) is constituted. Tables 5.14.a through 5.17.b present the results pertaining to the analysis of the same model.

a. Economic Disengagement

Tables 5.14.a and 5.14.b summarize the statistical results obtained when testing the significance of Model 5 for economic disengagement.

TABLE 5.14.a

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
Overall significance of the model
All countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.4820	0.4804	65.971	659.71	0.00000+00

* An F statistic of 2.959 is significant at the 0.999 level with k1 = 10 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square value of 25.19 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 10 degrees of freedom.

Table 5.14.a indicate relatively strong support for the integrative model. Both, the F and Wald statistics show strong support for the overall model. Also both the Buse R² and the R² are close to 0.5 which indicates that almost 50 percent of the variance is being explained.

TABLE 5.14.b

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio 709 DF
Econ. hegem *	-1.6051	0.09154	-17.535
Mili. hegem	0.10430	0.060049	1.7370
Economic * Dependency	-0.13457	0.011746	-11.457
Governmental+ Dependency	0.015413	0.006194	2.4883

Military Dependency	0.0094666	0.011738	0.80651
Size of the Economy	0.0000659	0.0000743	0.88732
Political Instability	-0.00001365	0.0000358	-1.3269
Government Incompetence	-0.0000475	0.0000358	-1.2738
Semiperiphery I	-0.024463	0.019206	-1.0875
Semiperiphery* II	0.019032	0.0093278	2.0404
Constant	1.0920	0.026597	41.056

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 709 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

These results, however, could be misleading since the model includes the economic dependency variable (measured by percent of exports to the United States) that, as mentioned earlier, is likely to be correlated with the dependent variable for purely commercial reasons. Because of it, the test was also performed excluding the economic dependency variable from the model. The results of such a test are presented in tables 5.15.a and 5.15.b.

TABLE 5.15.a

**MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
(Excluding Economic Dependency)
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983**

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.3012	0.2828	34.008	306.07	0.13426-59

* An F statistic of 3.098 is significant at the 0.999 level with k1 = 9 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square value of 23.59 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 9 degrees of freedom.

Results presented in tables 5.15.a indicate that the overall integrative model is statistically significant, even after the economic dependency variable has been removed. The model explains close to the 30 percent of the variance (after adjustment for autocorrelation and spatial correlation) once the economic dependency variable has been removed.

TABLE 5.15.b

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
(Excluding Economic Dependency)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 710 DF
Econ. hegem *	-1.3927	0.096766	-14.392
Mili. hegem	0.0033726	0.060158	0.0561
Governmental + Dependency	0.011458	0.005570	2.0571
Military Dependency	0.0047450	0.011077	0.4284
Size of the Economy	0.00016003	0.0001195	1.3391
Political Instability	0.0000278	0.000033	0.83426
Government Competence	-0.00003284	0.0000263	-1.2509
Semiperiphery I	0.029565	0.019468	1.5186
Semiperiphery * II	0.023691	0.011130	2.1286
Constant	0.99800	0.031171	32.017

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 710 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.15.a clearly shows that the decline of economic hegemonic capabilities is the one variable that weights the most when accounting for economic disengagement. Mobility to the Semiperiphery II also appear to be significant

contributor to the model. Governmental dependency, however, appear to be a significant variable but its coefficient holds a sign opposite than the expected. This means that the theory behind the conception of this part of the model may need to be revised at least as far as explaining economic disengagement is concerned.

b. Political Disengagement

Tables 5.16.a and 5.16.b present the statistical results pertaining to the testing of Model 5 for political disengagement.

TABLE 5.16.a

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.0955	0.3650	7.486	74.856	0.50743-11

* An F statistic of 2.959 is significant at the 0.999 level with k1 = 10 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square value of 25.19 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 10 degrees of freedom.

Table 5.16.a indicates that the overall integrative model is statistically significant when explaining political disengagement as expressed by both the F and Wald statistics. The model, however, is only marginally relevant since it

explains only the 9 percent of the variance once the data has been adjusted for autocorrelation. The square of the correlation coefficient between the observed data and the predicted, however, is of 0.36.

TABLE 5.16.b

**MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
(Political Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983**

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 709 DF
Econ. hegem *	-1.8250	0.30892	-5.9077
Mili. hegem	0.08922	0.20963	0.42560
Economic Dependency	-0.017645	0.01845	-0.95626
Governmental Dependency	-0.017645	0.013783	-1.7774
Military Dependency	-0.024497	0.030381	-1.2205
Size of the Economy	0.00012934	0.000078	1.6577
Political Instability	-0.000131	0.000086	-1.5275
Government Competence	0.000076	0.000059	1.2993
Semiperiphery I	0.011257	0.01468	0.76679
Semiperiphery II	0.016826	0.010519	1.5996
Constant	0.98082	0.08990	10.910

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 709 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.16.a indicates that the only variable that significantly contribute to the strength of the model is economic hegemony. All other variables are not statistically significant.

c. Diplomatic Disengagement

Tables 5.17.a and 5.17.b summarize the results of testing Model 5 for diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.17.a

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.3143	0.3176	32.499	324.99	0.79892-63

* An F statistic of 2.959 is significant at the 0.999 level with k1 = 10 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square value of 25.19 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 10 degrees of freedom.

The results pertaining to the integrative approach when testing its effects on diplomatic disengagement show support for the overall integrated model. Both the F and Wald statistics indicate that the model is statistically significant. Also both the Buse R² and the R² tell that such a model is explaining slightly more than 30 percent of the variance.

TABLE 5.17.b

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
 (Diplomatic Disengagement)
 Significance of variables in the model
 All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratio 709 DF
Econ. hegem +	0.044523	0.019572	2.2748
Mili. hegem *	-0.043137	0.010834	-3.9816
Economic Dependency *	-0.022316	0.0014371	-15.529
Governmental Dependency *	-0.0037338	0.0008129	-4.5934
Military Dependency *	-0.0050424	0.002371	-2.1264
Size of the Economy	-0.00001471	0.0000098	-1.5031
Political Instability	-0.00000358	0.0000040	-0.90476
Government Competence	-0.0000036	0.0000026	-1.3717
Semiperiph I *	0.010284	0.002654	3.8746
Semiperiph II *	0.005111	0.0018964	2.6951
Constant	0.87609	0.006693	130.89

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 709 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.17.a shows that the following variables are statistically significant and their sign corresponds to the expected sign indicated by the theory behind the model:

military hegemony, economic dependency, governmental dependency, military dependency, and the two variables indicating the relative position in the world system of countries. Table 5.17.a also shows that the effect of economic hegemonic capabilities is statistically significant but its sign is opposite than what the theory predicts.

Testing subsets within the integrated model

Tables 5.18 through 5.21 present the results of Wald tests performed for each one of the four different subsets of variables that are integrated in Model 5. The purpose of such tests is to compare the relative weight that each set of variables --with very particular theoretical implications-- has within the overall model. This procedure should enable us to tell how significant each set of variables is within the context of the interrelation of all variables included in the integrative model.

a. Economic Disengagement

Table 5.18 indicates that both sets of variables, hegemonic decline and dependency are significant within the context of the overall integrated model when explaining economic disengagement.

TABLE 5.18

**MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
All countries, 1948-1983**

Sets of Variables	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline *	373.15	0.00000+00
Dependency *	133.06	0.11751-27
National Capabilities	2.0483	0.56244
Position in the System	9.4357	0.89342-02

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

The test was also conducted, as in previous tests, excluding the economic dependency variable to eliminate the possibility of misleading results when weighing the significance of the dependency variables. Results for such a test are presented in Table 5.19.

TABLE 5.19

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
 (Economic Disengagement)
 (Excluding economic dependency)
 All countries, 1948-1983

Sets of Variables	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline *	256.73	0.17880-55
Dependency	4.4216	0.10961
National Capabilities	3.4102	0.33259
Position in the System	4.5383	0.10340

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

One can observe that, once the economic dependency variable is removed, the dependency set of variables lose their statistical relevance. Hence, when exports to the United States are excluded from the model the only significant subset of variables is the one pertaining to decline of hegemony.

b. Political Disengagement

Table 5.20 presents the results of the Wald tests performed for political disengagement. As can be observed the two sets of variables that are statistically significant within the context of the integrated model are, once again the hegemonic decline set and the national capabilities set.

TABLE 5.20

MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
(Political Disengagement)
All countries, 1948-1983

Sets of Variables	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline *	45.491	0.13235-09
Dependency	5.9634	0.11341
National Capabilities *	12.992	0.46549-02
Position in the System	2.5717	0.27642

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

c. Diplomatic Disengagement

Results presented in table 5.21 indicate that the dependency variables are the ones that most strongly contribute to the explanation of diplomatic foreign policy disengagement. It also shows that the hegemonic decline and the position in the world system variables are statistically significant. Hence, when explaining diplomatic disengagement one needs to take all three explanations into consideration.

TABLE 5.21

**MODEL 5: INTEGRATIVE MODEL
(Diplomatic Dependency)
All countries, 1948-1983**

Sets of Variables	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline *	16.827	0.22189-03
Dependency *	277.59	0.70160-59
National Capabilities	6.1857	0.10292
Position in the System *	15.057	0.53753-03

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

Results presented in tables 5.18 through 5.21 clearly indicate that the hegemonic decline set of variables is the one present in all forms of disengagement. The dependency variables are important only when it comes to diplomatic behavior and such is also the case of the position in the world system variables. The national capabilities variables are only important when explaining political disengagement.


5.6.1. MODEL 6: AN INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL

The last model tested in this dissertation incorporates all the variables introduced in Model 5 plus a series of interaction effects variables that reflect the mechanics by

which such variables are related to each other. An extra variable, geographic distance, was also incorporated into the model with the purpose to compose a more comprehensive explanation. Model 6 visually looks as follows:

Figure 6

INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL



Model 6

Tables 5.22.a through 5.25.b present the results obtained when testing the interaction effects model for all three dimensions of disengagement studied here.

a. Economic disengagement

Results pertaining to the statistical testing of Model 6 for economic disengagement are presented in tables 5.22.a and 5.22.b.

TABLE 5.22.a

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.8172	0.6722	156.285	3125.7	0.000000+00

* An F statistic of 2.266 is statistically significant at the 0.999 level for $k_1 = 20$ and $k_2 > 120$.

** A chi-square of 40.00 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 20 degrees of freedom.

The above presented results indicate that the overall model is statistically significant as shown by both the F and Wald statistics. The Buse R² show that 84 percent of the variance is explained by the model once it has been adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation. The R² tells that the square of the correlation coefficient between the observed data and the predicted is of 0.67.

TABLE 5.22.b

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
 (Economic Disengagement)
 Significance of variables in the model
 All countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficient	Standard error	T-ratios 699 DF
Econ. Hegem * (EH)	-2.0205	0.11509	-17.557
Mili. Hegem + (MH)	0.22388	0.081020	2.763
Economic * Dependency (ED)	-0.13458	0.055218	-2.4373
Governmental Dependency (GD)	-0.072646	0.050712	-1.4325
Military * Dependency (MD)	-0.51288	0.10325	-4.9674
Geographic * Distance (GgD)	0.000063	0.0000022	27.263
Size of the + Economy (SE)	-0.00039	0.000072	-5.5062
Political Instability (PI)	0.0000058	0.000036	0.1606
Government Competence	0.000004	0.0000306	0.11557
Semiperiph + I	-0.093756	0.010878	-8.6188
Semiperiph + II	-0.087209	0.0075132	-11.607
EH*ED	0.19287	0.16006	1.2050
MH*ED	-0.10765	0.11522	-0.93427

EH*GD	0.40702	0.26847	1.5161
MH*GD	-0.15905	0.21863	-0.72748
EH*MD *	4.2673	0.53748	7.9394
MH*MD +	-2.0112	0.25010	-8.0413
SE*ED	0.0001904	0.0001248	1.5260
SE*GD	0.000536	0.000405	1.323
SE*MD	0.000051	0.0007961	0.0645
Constant	0.95169	0.029664	32.082

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 699 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Results presented in table 5.22.b suggest that the effects of economic hegemony, economic dependency, military dependency and geographic distance are statistically significant and correspond to the expectations of the theory. Other variables, however, such as military hegemony, size of the economy and the relative position in the world system variables, are also statistically significant but their effect is contrary to what is predicted by the theory. Once again, in order to avoid the possibility of misleading results, the model was tested excluding the economic dependency variable from the equation when testing for economic disengagement. The results of such a test are presented in tables 5.23.a and 5.23.b.

TABLE 5.23.a

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.6857	0.5952	95.878	1534.1	0.0000+00

* An F statistic of 2.513 is statistically significant at a 0.999 level for k1 = 16 and k2 > 120.
 ** A chi-square of 34.27 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 16 degrees of freedom.

The results presented in Table 5.23.a indicate support for the overall significance of the model even after the economic dependency variable has been excluded. Both the F and Wald statistics appear to be significant. Also, the Buse R² indicates that the model explains 68 percent of the variance once it has been adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation.

TABLE 5.23.b

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
(Excluding Economic Dependency)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 703 DF
Econ. Hegem *	-1.7665	0.08265	-21.374
Mili. Hegem	0.08601	0.05803	1.4822
Governmental Dependency	-0.06291	0.045964	-1.3687

Military * Dependency	-0.38350	0.12517	-3.0638
Geographic * Distance	0.000065	0.0000028	23.341
Size of the Economy	-0.00007	0.000067	-1.1002
Political Instability	0.00003	0.000030	0.8654
Government Competence	-0.000013	0.0000245	-0.5422
Semiperiph + I	-0.063749	0.0099222	-6.4249
Semiperiph + II	-0.059716	0.0056440	-10.580
EH*GD	0.21673	0.25135	0.86225
MH*GD	-0.036119	0.20116	-0.17955
EH*MD *	4.1137	0.69314	5.9349
MH*MD +	-2.2065	0.32171	-6.8587
SE*GD +	0.0008576	0.00031	2.7953
SE*MD	-0.0009235	0.000597	-1.5468
Constant	0.83656	0.02556	32.726

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 703 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Results presented in table 5.23.a indicate that the following variables are statistically significant and their coefficients hold the sign expected according to the theory: economic hegemony, military dependency, and geographic distance. The relative position in the world system variables appear to be statistically significant but their coefficients

hold the sign opposite than what was expected by the theory.

b. Political disengagement

Tables 5.24.a and 5.24.b summarize the results of testing Model 6 to explain political disengagement.

TABLE 5.24.a

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.1932	0.4168	8.370	167.40	0.27676-24

* An F statistic of 2.266 is statistically significant at the 0.999 level for $k_1 = 20$ and $k_2 > 120$.

** A chi-square of 40.00 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 20 degrees of freedom.

Results presented in Table 5.24.a show support for the overall model as indicated by the F and Wald statistics. The Buse R² show that only 19 percent of the variance is being explained once adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation. The square of the correlation coefficient between the observed data and the predicted is of 0.416 as expressed by the R².

TABLE 5.24.b

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Political Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 699 DF
Econ. Hegem *	-1.8088	0.35782	-5.0552
Mili. Hegem	-0.15691	0.23835	-0.65831
Economic Dependency *	-0.43259	0.10809	-4.0023
Governmental Dependency	0.031286	0.10881	0.28753
Military Dependency	0.071202	0.24200	0.29422
Geographic + Distance	-0.000016	0.000003	-5.0868
Size of the Economy	-0.00001	0.00012	-0.76584
Political Instability	-0.0001756	0.000094	-1.8773
Government Competence *	0.000187	0.000064	2.9224
Semiperiph I	0.01188	0.014210	0.83575
Semiperiph II *	0.03512	0.010302	3.4096
EH*ED	0.53855	0.30472	1.7673
MH*ED *	0.41768	0.20605	2.3085
EH*GD	-0.16617	0.59013	-0.28159
MH*GD	0.09339	0.46722	0.19989
EH*MD	-0.97307	1.1765	-0.82708
MH*MD	0.45824	0.70164	0.65310

SE*ED	+	0.000619	0.00022	2.8673
SE*GD	*	-0.004013	0.00089	-4.5097
SE*MD		0.002260	0.001574	1.4361
Constant		1.1394	0.11263	10.116

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 699 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

The t-ratios presented in Table 5.24.b indicate that when explaining political disengagement economic hegemony, economic dependency and Semiperiphery II status are statistically significant variables that hold the expected sign according to the theory. It is, also, noticeable that geographic distance is a significant variable but when explaining political disengagement its coefficient holds a sign opposite to what the theory predicts.

c. Diplomatic disengagement.

Tables 5.25.a and 5.25.b present the results of testing Model 6 when explaining diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.25.a

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Overall model significance
All countries, 1948-1983

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.7313	0.2264	95.120	1902.4	0.0000+00

* An F statistic of 2.266 is statistically significant at the 0.999 level for $k_1 = 20$ and $k_2 > 120$.

** A chi-square of 40.00 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 20 degrees of freedom.

Results presented in table 5.25.a show that the overall model is statistically significant as indicated by the F and Wald statistics. When explaining diplomatic disengagement it explains 73 percent of the variance once adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation as indicated by the Buse R².

TABLE 5.25.b

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Diplomatic Disengagement)
Significance of variables in the model
All countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 699 DF
Econ. Hegem	-0.022754	0.018008	-1.2636
Mili. Hegem	-0.017073	0.010637	-1.6051
Economic Dependency	-0.016732	0.010293	-1.6255
Governmental+ Dependency	0.013719	0.006703	2.0468

Military Dependency *	-0.14928	0.019772	-7.5500
Geographic Distance *	0.0000077	0.0000004	17.963
Size of the Economy +	-0.0000406	0.000012	-3.3225
Political Instability	-0.0000012	0.000005	-0.22754
Government Competence	0.0000010	0.0000036	0.28850
Semiperiph I *	0.0061011	0.0026658	2.2887
Semiperiph II	-0.0018758	0.0017672	-1.0614
EH*ED *	0.062189	0.028388	2.1906
MH*ED +	-0.054040	0.016352	-3.3048
EH*GD +	-0.2053	0.035022	-5.8628
MH*GD *	0.13365	0.027710	4.8230
EH*MD *	1.0312	0.087406	11.797
MH*MD +	-0.43574	0.049998	-8.7151
SE*ED	0.000005	0.0000182	0.28047
SE*GD	-0.000085	0.0000538	-1.5770
SE*MD	0.26005	0.000100	0.25941
Constant	0.85566	0.0066426	128.81

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 699 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.25.a indicate that variables military dependency and geographic distance and Semiperiphery I status are statistically significant and their coefficients hold the expected sign. Government dependency and size of the economy

are statistically significant but hold the sign opposite than expected. It is noticeable also that the interaction variables joining hegemony and dependency are strongly significant.

Testing subsets of variables within the interactive effects model:

A series of Wald tests were performed to the five main sets of variables that compose Model 6. Tables 5.26 through 5.29 present the results of such tests.

a. Economic disengagement

As can be observed in table 5.26 when integrated in an interaction effects model all five sets of variables become statistically significant. Having geographic location as the most significant and hegemonic decline as the second most significant. The position that a country occupies in the world system is also significant when explaining economic disengagement.

TABLE 5.26
MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables		Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline	*	413.73	0.00000+00
Dependency	*	310.00	0.67776-66
National Capabilities	*	33.711	0.22797-06
Mobility in the System	*	155.63	0.16017-33
Geographic location	*	743.26	0.00000+00
HEG*DEP ^a	*	80.497	0.28206-14
SEC*DEP ^b		4.1233	0.24845

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

As in previously performed procedures, the test was also ran excluding the economic dependency variable. Table 5.27 shows the Wald test results for economic disengagement after the economic dependency variable has been excluded.

TABLE 5.27

**MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
(Excluding Economic Dependency)
All countries, 1948-1983**

Variables		Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline	*	618.74	0.00000+00
Dependency	*	12.617	0.18209-02
National Capabilities		1.9201	0.38288
Mobility in the System	*	120.09	0.83826-26
Geographic location	*	544.81	0.00000+00
HEG*DEP ^a	*	49.742	0.40867-09
SEC*DEP ^b		8.842	0.12025-01

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

Once again all five sets of variables are statistically significant when incorporated into an interaction effects model even after the economic dependency variable has been removed. Also, the interaction effects (hegemony * dependency) subset of variables appeared to be statistically significant. In this case hegemonic decline showed to be the most significant of all sets of variables.

b. Political disengagement

When explaining political disengagement all the five basic sets of variables appear to be significant. Also, the set that incorporates the interaction variables (size of the economy * dependency) is significant.

TABLE 5.28

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Political Disengagement)
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables		Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline	*	38.132	0.52439-08
Dependency	*	30.225	0.12376-05
National capabilities	*	22.473	0.51997-04
Position in the world system	*	11.915	0.25863-02
Geographic location	*	25.876	0.36415-06
HEG*DEP ^a		14.946	0.20685-01
SEC*DEP ^b	*	27.705	0.41889-05

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

c. Diplomatic disengagement

Table 5.29 shows that geographic distance is the most significant variable that accounts to explain diplomatic disengagement. Also, the national capabilities set of variables and the position in the world system variables appear to be significant contributors to the explanation. Of the interaction effects variables, only the interaction of hegemony with dependency appears to be significant when explaining treaty activity (diplomatic disengagement).

TABLE 5.29

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Diplomatic Disengagement)
All countries, 1948-1983

Variables	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline	8.4596	0.14555-01
Dependency	8.0841	0.44305-01
National capabilities *	13.075	0.44763-02
Position in the world system *	14.772	0.61988-03
Geographic location *	322.30	0.00000+00
HEG*DEP ^a *	177.81	0.99048-35
SEC*DEP ^b	2.5935	0.45864

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

5.6.2. MODEL 6: EXCLUDING CUBA

The inclusion of Cuba as part of the sample opened the possibility of ending up with skewed results given the peculiarities of Cuba's relationship vis a vis the United States that was radically different than the rest of Latin America during the time period of this study. For this reason all tests pertaining to Model 6 were performed a second time excluding Cuba. The results of such a procedure are presented in tables 5.30.a through 5.37.

a. Economic Disengagement

Statistical results of testing Model 6, excluding Cuba from the sample, when explaining economic disengagement are presented in tables 5.30.a and 5.30.b.

TABLE 5.30.a

**MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Excluding Cuba
Overall model significance
19 countries, 1948-1983**

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.8016	0.7913	133.956	2679.1	0.00000+00

* An F statistic of 2.266 is statistically significant at the 0.999 level for k1 = 20 and k2 > 120.

** A chi-square of 40.00 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 20 degrees of freedom.

Results reported in table 5.30.a strongly support the statistical significance of the overall model as indicated by the F and Wald statistics. As indicated by both R^2 , the model is explaining over 80 percent of the variance once the original data has been adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation.

TABLE 5.30.b

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
(Excluding Cuba)
Significance of variables in the model
19 countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 663 DF
Econ. Hegem *	-1.5794	0.11149	-14.166
Mili. Hegem	0.079229	0.083865	0.94473
Economic Dependency	0.062006	0.051670	1.2000
Governmental Dependency	-0.054243	0.045405	-1.1946
Military * Dependency	-0.30370	0.11125	-2.7298
Geographic * Distance	0.0000699	0.0000025	28.206
Size of the+ Economy	-0.0001425	0.000068	-2.1047
Political + Instability	0.0001029	0.000032	3.2128
Government Competence	0.000017	0.0000304	0.54906

Semiperiph + I	-0.056852	0.0075830	-7.4973
Semiperiph + II	-0.071007	0.0057805	-12.284
EH*ED +	-0.38786	0.14649	-2.6478
MH*ED	0.11088	0.10624	1.0437
EH*GD	0.04537	0.25423	0.17847
MH*GD	0.11304	0.20665	0.54702
EH*MD *	3.3712	0.58983	5.7155
MH*MD +	-1.8306	0.28103	-6.5138
SE*ED *	-0.000421	0.00014	-2.9765
SE*GD	-0.000078	0.00040	-0.19728
SE*MD	0.000024	0.000664	0.36313
Constant	0.76567	0.035711	21.441

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 663 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.30.a indicate that the variables: economic hegemony, military dependency and geographic distance are statistically significant and support the predictions of the theory. Variables: size of the economy, political instability and the relative position in the world system variables are statistically significant but contradict the expectations of the theory as shown by the signs of their coefficients.

Economic disengagement (excluding economic dependency)

In order to avoid misleading results due to the inclusion of economic dependency in the equation, Model 6 (excluding Cuba) was also tested without economic dependency. The results are presented in tables 5.31.a and 5.31.b.

TABLE 5.31.a

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Excluding Cuba
Overall model significance
19 countries, 1948-1983

ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R ²	R ²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.6712	0.7643	85.113	1361.8	0.0000+00

* An F statistic of 2.513 is statistically significant at a 0.999 level for k1 = 16 and k2 > 120.
 ** A chi-square of 34.27 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 16 degrees of freedom.

The results reported in tables 5.31.a and 5.31.b indicate clear support for the significance of Model 6 even after economic dependency has been excluded. Both the F and Wald statistics are significant and the Buse-R² indicates that over 67 percent of the variance is explained once adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation.

TABLE 5.31.b
MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
Excluding Cuba
Significance of variables in the model
19 countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 667 DF
Econ. Hegem *	-1.6418	0.087469	-18.770
Mili. Hegem	0.11682	0.060473	1.9318
Governmental Dependency	-0.041827	0.047031	-0.8894
Military * Dependency	-0.27442	0.12293	-2.2323
Geographic * Distance	0.0000693	0.000003	26.461
Size of the Economy	-0.000104	0.000063	-1.6443
Political + Instability	0.000067	0.000033	2.0502
Government Competence	0.0000111	0.000027	0.4187
Semiperiph + I	-0.048862	0.007306	-6.6884
Semiperiph + II	-0.052947	0.00628	-8.4253
EH*GD	0.055170	0.25902	0.21300
MH*GD	0.063981	0.21030	0.30423
EH*MD *	3.1712	0.66856	4.7433
MH*MD +	-1.7439	0.31897	-5.4674
SE*GD	0.00049	0.000326	1.5088
SE*MD	-0.00069	0.00065	-1.0657
Constant	0.76028	0.027222	27.929

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 663 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

The results of the t-ratios reported in Table 5.31.b indicate that the variables: economic hegemony, military dependency and geographic distance are statistically significant and respond to the expectations of the theory. Variables political instability and the relative position in the world system variables are also statistically significant but contradict the expectations placed by the theory.

b. Political disengagement

Tables 5.32.a and 5.32.b present the results of testing Model 6 with the exclusion of Cuba when explaining political disengagement.

TABLE 5.32.a

**MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Excluding Cuba
Overall model significance
19 countries, 1948-1983**

POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.1884	0.4125	7.694	156.87	0.11362-21

* An F statistic of 2.266 is statistically significant at the 0.999 level for $k_1 = 20$ and $k_2 > 120$.
** A chi-square of 40.00 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 20 degrees of freedom.

Results reported in table 5.32.a indicate support for the overall Model 6, when explaining political disengagement

as shown by both the F and Wald statistics. The R² indicates that the square of the correlation coefficient between observed data and the predicted is of 0.40; however, only 17 percent of the variance is explained once adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation.

TABLE 5.32.b

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Political Disengagement)
(Excluding Cuba)
Significance of variables in the model
19 countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 663 DF
Econ. Hegem *	-1.3778	0.39181	-3.5164
Mili. Hegem	-0.30468	0.26335	-1.1569
Economic Dependency *	-0.33174	0.10755	-3.0845
Governmental Dependency	0.019957	0.10947	0.18231
Military Dependency	0.28979	0.23438	1.2364
Geographic Distance +	-0.000011	0.0000031	-3.5692
Size of the Economy	-0.000006	0.000125	-0.0476
Political Instability	0.0000456	0.000104	0.43764
Government Competence *	0.0001979	0.0000639	3.0979
Semiperiph I *	0.031134	0.01496	2.0818

Semiperiph II *	0.037185	0.010698	3.4757
EH*ED	0.16110	0.30482	0.52852
MH*ED *	0.69335	0.20846	3.3261
EH*GD	-0.49533	0.57334	-0.86393
MH*GD	0.37315	0.45367	0.82252
EH*MD	-1.7369	1.1649	-1.4910
MH*MD	0.57429	0.69888	0.82173
SE*ED +	0.0005531	0.00022	2.5708
SE*GD *	-0.0040755	0.000891	-4.5724
SE*MD	0.0023761	0.00163	1.4563
Constant	0.99828	0.12075	8.2672

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 663 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.32.b indicate that economic hegemony, economic dependency, government competence and relative position in the world system variables are statistically significant and respond to the expectations of the theory. Geographic distance appears to be statistically significant but its coefficient holds a sign opposite to the theoretical expectations of the model.

c. Diplomatic disengagement.

Tables 5.33.a and 5.33.b summarize the result of testing the significance of Model 6 (with the exclusion of Cuba) when explaining diplomatic disengagement.

TABLE 5.33.a

**MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
Excluding Cuba
Overall model significance
19 countries, 1948-1983**

DIPLOMATIC DISENGAGEMENT				
Buse R²	R²	F*	Wald**	p value
0.7271	0.3817	88.319	1766.4	0.00000+00

* An F statistic of 2.266 is statistically significant at the 0.999 level for $k_1 = 20$ and $k_2 > 120$.

** A chi-square of 40.00 is statistically significant at 0.005 for 20 degrees of freedom.

Results reported in table 5.33.a indicate strong support for the overall significance of the model as expressed by both the F and Wald statistics. The square of the correlation coefficient between the observed data and the predicted is of 0.38 and the Buse-R² is 0.72 which means that 72 percent of the variance is being explained, once adjusted for autocorrelation and spatial correlation.

TABLE 5.33.b

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
 (Diplomatic Disengagement)
 (Excluding Cuba)
 Significance of variables in the model
 19 countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Estimated coefficients	Standard error	T-ratios 663 DF
Econ. Hegem	-0.02245	0.018268	-1.2290
Mili. Hegem	-0.010176	0.01106	-0.91980
Economic Dependency	-0.014750	0.010598	-1.3918
Governmental Dependency	0.012647	0.0065724	1.9243
Military * Dependency	-0.11925	0.021240	-5.6147
Geographic * Distance	0.0000098	0.0000004	21.855
Size of the Economy	-0.0000196	0.00001210	-1.6205
Political Instability	0.0000053	0.0000067	0.79450
Government Competence	0.000002	0.0000037	0.55090
Semiperiph * I	0.009056	0.0027292	3.3182
Semiperiph II	-0.002423	0.0018808	-1.2883
EH*ED *	0.064261	0.029181	2.2022
MH*ED +	-0.053625	0.016248	-3.3004
EH*GD +	-0.16564	0.033089	-5.0061
MH*GD *	0.10276	0.026071	3.9417
EH*MD *	0.85352	0.096349	8.8586
MH*MD +	-0.37729	0.052942	-7.1265

SE*ED	0.0000014	0.000019	0.07369
SE*GD *	-0.000137	0.000054	-2.5431
SE*MD	0.00011	0.000105	1.0527
Constant	0.83834	0.007094	118.18

* statistically significant and has the expected sign

+ statistically significant and has sign opposite than expected

For 663 degrees of freedom a t-ratio of 1.96 is significant at the 0.005 level on a two-tail test.

Table 5.33.b indicate that military dependency, geographic distance and position in the world system variables are significant and support the expectations of the theory. It is also noticeable that most of the interaction variables are strongly significant according to the t-ratios reported in the table.

Testing subsets of variables within the interactive effects model (excluding Cuba):

The effects of the different subsets of variables that compose Model 6 were also tested for the model when Cuba is excluded. Results are presented in tables 5.34 through 5.37.

Economic Disengagement

Table 5.34 indicates that all five sets of variables are statistically significant when introduced into an interaction effects model even when Cuba is excluded. The table also

shows that the set of variables corresponding to the interaction of hegemony and dependency is significant.

TABLE 5.34

**MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
(Excluding Cuba)
19 countries, 1948-1983**

Variable		Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline *		262.00	0.12827-56
Dependency *		12.769	0.51639-02
National capabilities *		17.007	0.70433-03
Position in the world system *		167.39	0.44783-36
Geographic location *		795.59	0.00000+00
HEG*DEP ^a	*	53.489	0.93508-09
SEC*DEP ^b		8.9514	0.29944-01

* Statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

As in previous instances, the model was tested for economic disengagement excluding the economic dependency variable to prevent misleading results derived of the natural correlation of the two trade variables. Results are presented in table 5.35.

TABLE 5.35

**MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Economic Disengagement)
(Excluding Cuba and economic dependency)
19 countries, 1948-1983**

Variable	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline *	445.32	0.00000+00
Dependency	6.4652	0.39455-01
National capabilities	6.9071	0.74919-01
Position in the world system *	84.410	0.46846-18
Geographic location *	700.18	0.00000+00
HEG*DEP ^a *	31.389	0.25504-05
SEC*DEP ^b	2.919	0.23231

* Statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

The results of Table 5.35 indicate that when the economic dependency is removed, the dependency set loses its significance and so does the national capability set. The remaining three sets appear to be significant. Also, the interaction effects set (hegemony * dependency) appears to be statistically significant.

Political Disengagement

Table 5.36 present the results of the Wald tests pertaining to political disengagement. As can be observed the

hegemonic decline, position in the world system and geographic distance sets are statistically significant. Also, both interaction effects sets of variables appear to be significant.

TABLE 5.36

MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Political Disengagement)
(Excluding Cuba)
19 countries, 1948-1983

Variable	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline *	24.166	0.56536-05
Dependency	11.756	0.82679-02
National capabilities	11.903	0.77218-02
Position in the world system *	12.516	0.19152-02
Geographic location *	12.739	0.35809-03
HEG*DEP ^a *	19.198	0.38413-02
SEC*DEP ^b *	27.319	0.50463-05

* Statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

Diplomatic Disengagement

Table 5.37 presents the results obtained by the Wald tests on all sub-sets of variables when explaining diplomatic

disengagement. As can be observed geographic location, dependency and the relative position in the world system are the sets of variables that appear to be statistically significant. Also the interaction effects subset corresponding to hegemony and dependency appear to be significant. Hegemonic decline and national capabilities do not seem to be all that relevant to explain treaty activity.

TABLE 5.37

**MODEL 6: INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL
(Diplomatic Disengagement)
(Excluding Cuba)
19 countries, 1948-1983**

Variable	Wald test	p value
Hegemonic decline	4.3293	0.11479
Dependency *	32.839	0.34831-06
National capabilities	3.3933	0.33487
Position in the * world system	29.454	0.40193-06
Geographic location *	477.65	0.000000+00
HEG*DEP ^a *	106.52	0.10888-19
SEC*DEP ^b	6.9883	0.72271-01

* Statistically significant at the 0.005 level

^a (Hegemony * dependency) set of 6 variables.

^b (Size of the economy * dependency) set of 3 variables.

5.7. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Table 5.38 presents the results of the Wald tests performed to test the significance of the overall models.

TABLE 5.38
WALD TESTS FOR OVERALL MODELS
DISENGAGEMENT

	Economic	Economic *	Political	Diplomatic
MODEL 1	148.79		39.548	33.139
MODEL 2	312.32	3.9291	16.009	322.59
MODEL 3	13.665		52.815	47.925
MODEL 4	2.137		9.082	6.4643
MODEL 5	659.71	306.07	74.856	324.99
MODEL 6	3125.7	1534.1	167.40	1902.4
MODEL 6 excluding Cuba	2679.1	1361.8	156.87	1766.4

* Economic dependency variable excluded from equations.

Table 5.38 clearly indicates that the interaction effects model, Model 6, is the one that shows most statistical significance. It can be observed, also, that the inclusion of Cuba alters the results obtained when comparing significance levels of the models. Nevertheless, at such high levels of significance the difference does not appear to be all that relevant.

Table 5.39 summarizes the results obtained when performing Wald tests on the different subsets of variables that compose Model 6. This table allows comparisons regarding significance across the different components of the model.

TABLE 5.39
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENT SUBSETS OF VARIABLES
DISENGAGEMENT DIMENSIONS

	Economic		Economic ^o		Political		Diplomatic	
	All	Wt/ C	All	Wt/ C	All	Wt/ C	All	Wt/ C
Hegemony	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Dependency	*	*	*		*			*
National capabilities	*	*	*		*		*	
Position in world system	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Geographic location	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
HEG*DEP	*	*	*	*		*	*	*
SEC*DEP					*	*		

^o economic disengagement, economic dependency variable excluded from the equation

* statistically significant at the 0.005 level

All = all countries included

Wt/C = without Cuba

The results presented above clearly show that the geographic location of countries and the relative position in the world system are the two sets of variables that appear to

be significant through all dimensions of foreign policy behavior analyzed in here. The Wald test results obtained for the other subsets of variables seemed to be slightly more ambiguous.

The hegemony subset appears to be significant when explaining economic and political disengagement. However, they are statistically insignificant when explaining diplomatic disengagement.

Regarding the dependency subset of variables, those are clearly significant to explain economic and political disengagement as long as Cuba is included in the sample. The opposite occurs when explaining diplomatic disengagement that is only significant when Cuba is not included. These results suggest an extremely ambiguous relationship between dependency and disengagement.

The national capabilities subset appears to be clearly significant for the three dimensions but only as long as Cuba is included in the sample. Once it is removed the national capabilities subset loses all significance.

The fact that the presence of Cuba is so determinant in the significance of these last two subsets of variables indicate that it may be wise to exclude the Cuban case from the analysis because it is actually skewing the results.

As mentioned earlier, the results on the relative position in the world system subset of variables show that

this subset is significant for all dimensions. Nevertheless, it would be important to check the results of Table 5.40 because even though this subset of variables is significant the signs of their coefficients suggest that the theory needs to be revised.

TABLE 5.40
SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
IN INTERACTION EFFECTS MODEL

Dimensions->	Economic		Economic°		Political		Diplomatic	
	All	Wt/ C	All	Wt/ C	All	Wt/ C	All	Wt/ C
Economic Hegemony	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Military Hegemony	+							
Economic Dependency	*				*	*		
Governmental Dependency							+	
Military Dependency	*	*	*	*			*	*
Geographic Distance	*	*	*	*	+	+	*	*
Size of the Economy	+	+					+	
Political Instability		+		+				
Government Competence		*		*	*	*		
Semiperiph I	+	+	+	+		*	*	*
Semiperiph II	+	+	+	+	*	*		

EH*ED		+					*	*
MH*ED					*	*	+	+
EH*GD							+	+
MH*GD							*	*
EH*MD	*	*	*	*			*	*
MH*MD	+	+	+	+			+	+
SE*ED		*			+	+		
SE*GD			+		*	*		*
SE*MD								

° economic disengagement, economic dependency variable excluded from the equation

* statistically significant and coefficients hold the expected sign

+ statistically significant but coefficients hold sign opposite than expected

Table 5.40 suggests the following:

a) of the hegemony variables it is economic hegemony the one that most significantly affects the foreign policy behavior of nations when it comes to economic and political disengaging behavior.

b) military hegemonic decline does not seem to have a significant effect on the Latin American effort to seek greater autonomy vis a vis the United States.

c) economic dependency is only significant when explaining political disengaging behavior.

d) of all the dependency variables, military dependency

seems to be the one that most significantly affects the foreign policy behavior of nations. This suggests that as long as Latin American countries have strong military ties to the United States economic and diplomatic disengagement will be more difficult.

e) geographic distance is an essential variable that needs to be taken into consideration by any comprehensive explanation of foreign policy behavior.

Results presented in table 5.40 suggest that as distance between countries increase it is easier to disengage in terms of their trade and also as far as their treaty activity is concerned. The results, also, suggest that the opposite occurs when it comes to political disengagement. In such a case geographic proximity appears to be closely associated with political disengagement. These differences across foreign policy dimensions could be explained by the fact that verbal statements and voting in the United Nations are, many times, the only behavioral outlets for countries to show dissatisfaction. It is easier and politically "cheaper" to make a verbal statement than to change trade partners or to sign new treaties.

f) national attribute variables appear to be significant in some instances of foreign policy disengagement, but the

results suggest that the theory may need to be revised. It is not clear that as countries grow economically they seek greater autonomy. Quite the opposite: the results show that as they grow they rely more on trade with the United States. Also, it is not clear that high levels of political stability are associated with disengaging behavior. The results indicate that, quite the opposite than expected, low levels of political stability appear to be significant when explaining economic and political disengagement.

g) the level of governmental competence appears to be significant when explaining economic and political disengagement. However, even though the signs of the coefficient appear to be the expected ones (positive) by the theory, one cannot trust the veracity of this because the coefficients of the component variables of this one show negative signs --which is opposite to the expected ones.

h) the relative position of a country in the world system is a variable that appears to be significant and relevant for explaining foreign policy disengagement. However, the theory speculates that as countries move upwardly in the system they will tend to be more likely to disengage from their hegemon. The results obtained here indicate that the opposite takes place when it comes to

economic disengagement. As countries move upwardly in the system they will strengthen their economic ties (in this case commercially) with their mentor. However, when it comes to explaining political and diplomatic disengagement the theory appears to be right, countries moving upwardly in the system appear to be more likely to seek greater political and diplomatic autonomy.

CHAPTER 6: FINAL REMARKS**6.1 SUMMARY****6.1.1 Review of the literature.**

The review of the literature presented in Chapter 1 clearly shows the need for further analysis on the international behavior of the "not so powerful nations". It was not until the mid seventies, with the Oil Embargo, that scholars and decision makers in the United States decided to pay more attention to the events that took place in those countries. The effects of the oil embargo and the possibility of the spreading out of raw material producer associations, during the decade of the seventies, forced the acknowledgement that strong industrialized nations were also vulnerable to the behavior of secondary nations. During that time, new concepts such as interdependency, dependency and vulnerability were introduced to the discipline of foreign affairs. Even though such concepts incorporated the "not so powerful nations" into the world politics picture, the dynamics of foreign policy behavior of such countries remains to be properly understood.

The literature on foreign policy restructuring was the first to acknowledge the conflictive nature of the relationship between dependent nations and their mentors. Nevertheless, such literature was very small in its production; and, in spite of valuable contributions to the understanding of foreign policy distancing, it was unable to explain (and much less predict) the breakdown of the Eastern Bloc or the secular Latin American process of secular disengagement from the United States. Thus, it was unable to trace an evolutionary process leading to satellite distancing from their hegemons.

The literature neglected not only the study of "minor nations", but also the study of Latin America as an area study. It was greatly neglected until the late seventies -- with exception of the Cuban chapter (attention was paid to the Cuban Revolution and to the potential spread of revolutionary affairs to the rest of the region; but once the threat was controlled, Latin America disappeared from the professional journals). A dramatic change was registered, however, in the amount of attention paid to Latin America during the eighties due, once again, to the threat of spreading revolutionary movements that were feared to follow the Nicaraguan steps.

When exploring the studies that have been conducted on the prevalent tendencies in the relationship between Latin

American countries and the United States, one notices that the few existing pieces of work on that issue show a certain amount of consensus on the fact that the tendency is toward a greater autonomy. No empirical studies, however, that prove this fact had been conducted, nor explanatory empirical work had been developed on the issue. Addressing such a weakness in the literature was one of the main purposes that originated this dissertation. Two major goals were attempted in this work: first, to objectively describe patterns of secular Latin American behavior in their foreign policy vis a vis the United States. Second, to theoretically explain such patterns.

6.1.2 Descriptive analysis.

The descriptive results, presented in Chapter 4, suggest empirical evidence to accept that the Latin American political, economic and diplomatic foreign policy behavior towards the United States is one of disengagement --at least for as far as the 1948-83 period. Latin America --the traditional "backyard" of the United States-- as an aggregated region as much as a collection of individual countries --with a few exceptions-- appears to have been engaged in a secular process of disengagement vis a vis the

United States during the period under study.

The results suggest, in accordance with the literature on cycles of hegemony¹, that economic disengagement seems to precede the occurrence of political disengagement. Observed longitudinal trends for each Latin American country indicate that nineteen out of twenty countries have been economically disengaging from the United States since 1947. The political process of disengagement, on the other hand, did not start until 1959 as a generalized behavioral pattern for the whole region. Nevertheless, once it started, it has been a slow but steady process for nineteen out of twenty nations. The twentieth nation, Cuba, radically restructured its foreign policy toward the United States in 1959. The final result is that since 1959 twenty out of twenty countries show a clear tendency toward seeking greater political autonomy from the United States in their behavior expressed in the United Nations.

Regarding the process of diplomatic disengagement one can observe that different countries started their distancing from the United States at different points in time. Nevertheless, thirteen out of twenty countries show solid evidence of disengagement. Of the remaining seven, one --Paraguay-- presents only a marginal rejection, and another

¹ See review of the literature on Chapter 2.

one --the Dominican Republic-- presents strong support for the opposite hypothesis --the one of decrease in distance. Five countries out of twenty show no clear trend. These countries are Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti. As can be noticed those are all countries that are geographically located the closest to the United States. These results are not surprising since one can expect, guided by simple common sense, that the treaty activity of neighbor countries will continue to be active and constant regardless of any disengaging commitment, on the part of their governments, due to the natural demands placed by their physical boundaries. Of the twenty countries under study, the remaining thirteen show a clear trend towards disengagement.

Forecasting a secular increase of conflict in the relationship between the United States and the Latin American region --as a consequence of disengagement-- would only be plausible if one is to argue that the United States will attempt to reverse the trends by utilizing coercive measures. Coercive measures, however, have proven to be extremely expensive for the finances and political legitimacy of the United States government and, thus, costly for the entire nation. An investment in forceful control was, perhaps, likely to be justified at a time when the spread of communism was perceived as a serious threat to the national security of the country. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the

unquestionable failure of the communist economic model will, necessarily, be translated into a major redefinition of the American national priorities. Given the domestic political and economic situation that the United States lives on the eve of 1993, one could reasonably expect that the American administration would be more likely to concentrate its efforts on the improvement of its domestic economy than on attempting to prevent further distancing of Latin American nations. The presidential election results of 1992 clearly demonstrate the support of the American population for such political agenda.

The history of the last thirty years show that the United States government has tried all sorts of different strategies to keep control of Latin America. Policies that go from Alliance for Progress, counterinsurgency joint efforts, aid for development, preferential trade treatment, Defense of Human Rights, support of dictatorial regimes, support of redemocratization of the region, etc, were implemented. And, in spite of being very costly efforts to the Union, the final result is that although such policies may have been able to control short term events, they proved to be unable to alter the secular trend toward disengagement in the long run. The results presented in Chapter 4 suggest that American support of certain governments or policies, during certain periods of time, did not seem to alter the long term trend.

Given that coercive control did not work, a commercial integrative partnership could be an easier and less costly strategy to revert the Latin American disengaging trends. Since one of the principal causes of the American economic crisis is the low level of international competitiveness, one could expect that it would be rational for the American administration to attempt to develop greater commercial convergence with the countries of the region to improve its international competitive position, than to invest on coercive control to regain its position in the region. If that is the choice made by the United States administration, then a frictionless reversal of the distancing process could be forecasted for years to come.

6.1.3 Theoretical explanation.

The implications that the patterns of Latin American disengagement --described here-- could have, would very much depend on what explanations of such trends are found. The second goal of this work has been to assess the significance of the different possible contending theoretical explanations for the issue. This way, the second research step undertaken by this dissertation work was to explore such explanations and the results obtained were reported in Chapter 5.

Six models, each representing a different theoretical approach, were tested to determine which of them best explains the occurrence of foreign policy disengagement in Latin America. The models were the following:

Model 1: the declining hegemony approach.

Model 2: the dependency approach.

Model 3: the national capabilities approach.

Model 4: the World System approach.

Model 5: an integrative model that aggregates the previous 4 theoretical explanations.

Model 6: an interaction effects model derived from Model 5 that includes possible interactions between the different variables in the model plus takes into account the weight of geographic distance.

6.1.4 Overall model analysis.

A series of Wald tests were performed to test the significance of the overall models and also to test the significance of the subsets of variables that composed each theoretical component. Such results clearly indicated that the interaction effects model, Model 6, was the one that showed the highest statistical significance. This is to say that the best possible explanation for the foreign policy

behavior of Latin American countries is the one that takes into consideration the contributions of hegemonic decline, dependency, national capabilities, and relative position in the world system. Such a model, also, incorporates the simultaneous interactive effect of hegemonic decline and dependency, plus the one of dependency and national capability. Lastly Model 6 includes as an essential component the geographic distance variable. All of these elements compose the model that most accurately explain Latin American foreign policy disengagement.

The history of Cuba, during the last thirty years, radically differs from the rest of the region and is openly reflected in its foreign policy toward the United States. Given the fact that the behavior of Cuba was so different from the rest of the Latin American nations, the model was also tested with the exclusion of Cuba. The purpose was to prevent the possibility of skewed results introduced by the inclusion of Cuba. It was observed --not surprisingly-- that the inclusion of Cuba significantly altered the results obtained for model 6.

6.1.5 Analysis of the components of the model.

Wald tests were performed to assess the statistical significance of the different subsets of variables that composed model 6. T-ratios were used to determine the statistical significance of individual variables. A brief summary of such results is presented in the following paragraphs:

A. The evidence obtained suggests that geographic distance and the relative position in the world system were the two sets of variables that record consistent high levels of significance through all three dimensions of foreign policy behavior analyzed. This is to say that these two variables alone are the ones that most strongly affect the results obtained by the model. A more detailed discussion on these variables is presented in points B. and C.

B. The foreign policy behavior of Latin American nations is very much constrained by their geography. Countries physically located closely to the United States will find more difficult and less attractive to disengage, especially if that disengagement involves change in their trade patterns and their treaty activity.

The results obtained suggest that as geographical distance between countries increased it was easier to disengage in terms of their trade and also as far as their treaty activity was concerned. It was also found that geographic proximity was closely associated with political disengagement. These differences across foreign policy dimensions could be explained by the fact that verbal statements and voting in the United Nations are, many times, the only behavioral outlets for weak neighbor countries to show dissatisfaction. This is to say that while change in the trade behavior or treaty activity of countries located physically close to the U.S. could be not feasible or too costly, voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations could be a less costly and more feasible outlet to show their desire for greater autonomy.

C. Regarding the relative position in the world system subset of variables, the results showed that this subset was significant for all three dimensions of foreign policy behavior. Nevertheless, this subset of variables in spite of being significant showed mixed coefficient signs. The theory speculates that as countries move upwardly in the system they will tend to be more likely to disengage from their hegemon. Coefficients for political and diplomatic behavior hold the predicted signs according to the theory; economic behavior,

however, presented signs opposite than those predicted by the theory. These results indicate that as countries move upwardly in the World System structure they tend to politically and diplomatically disengage. Economically, however, they will tend to move closer toward the United States. So, upwardly moving countries will tend toward greater political and diplomatic independence while moving toward greater economic (or at least commercial) interdependence. In other words, as Latin American countries manage to industrialize and change their position in the international division of labor, changing from being a raw material supplier to being a supplier of higher value added goods, they will tend to be more vocal in their opposition to the United States in international forums such as the U.N. They will also seek greater treaty activity diversification. On the other hand, contrary to such distancing behavior, they will simultaneously tend to share common economic interests with the United States. Such convergence in commercial interests will yield greater economic closeness. This way it is to be expected that countries such as Mexico or Chile, that have been changing their export composition from raw material suppliers to manufactured goods will find advantageous to seek greater economic closeness with the United States because they share common commercial interests.

This leads, once again, to the conclusion that, as Latin American countries move upwardly in the international system, their foreign policy behavior vis a vis the U.S. will be characterized by greater political autonomy while experiencing a commercial convergence with the United States.

D. Table 6.1 was constructed attempting to present a speculative exercise of what could be expected in the behavior of countries in all three foreign policy dimensions given their position in the world system and their geographic location.

According to the results presented earlier, one can expect that countries that are upwardly moving in the World-System will tend to experience greater level of convergence with the United States in their trade relationship (see Table 6.1). That will be the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela. One is to expect that, given the special relationship between Panama and the US, the future of that relationship will be of convergence.

The results obtained in this research indicate that geographic location is the most powerful variable to explain political and diplomatic disengagement. Thus, when especulating about possible scenarios for the foreign policy behavior of Latin American nations in these two behavioral dimensions, one can expect that countries geographically

located near the US will continue to show a pattern of increasing autonomy in their voting behavior in the UN. That would be the case of Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela. On the other hand, the very same geographic vicinity will imply greater levels of convergence in the treaty activity of these countries vis a vis the United States. This way, as can be observed in Table 6.1, one can expect that the very same countries that gain greater political autonomy will go through greater diplomatic convergence with the US as a result of the natural demands of their geographic position.

Table 6.1
EXPECTED BEHAVIOR OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
After 1983

Country	Economic	Political	Diplomatic
Argentina	convergence	-----	-----
Bolivia	-----	-----	-----
Brazil	convergence	-----	-----
Chile	convergence	-----	-----
Colombia	convergence	autonomy	convergence
Costa Rica	convergence	autonomy	convergence
Cuba			
Dominican	-----	-----	-----
Ecuador	-----	-----	-----
El Salvador	-----	autonomy	convergence
Guatemala	-----	autonomy	convergence

Haiti	-----	autonomy	convergence
Honduras	-----	autonomy	convergence
Mexico	convergence	autonomy	convergence
Nicaragua	-----	autonomy	convergence
Panama	convergence	autonomy	convergence
Paraguay	-----	-----	-----
Peru	-----	-----	-----
Uruguay	-----	-----	-----
Venezuela	convergence	autonomy	convergence

----- predominance of status quo

Results obtained for the other subsets of variables, appeared to be more ambiguous and are presented in points E, F, and G.

E. When testing the significance of hegemonic decline, it was found that the hegemony subset of variables appeared to be significant when explaining economic and political disengagement. Nevertheless, they were statistically insignificant when explaining diplomatic disengagement. This is to say that as the relative share of world resources held by the United States decreases, Latin American countries will tend to increase their level of political and economic autonomy vis a vis the United States. They will not, however, decrease their treaty activity with the U.S. and this could be explained by geographic reasons. Treaty activity as was

mentioned before is bound by geography to a greater extent than other instances of foreign policy behavior.

Another important finding was that, of the hegemony variables analyzed, economic hegemony appears to be the one that significantly affected the foreign policy behavior of nations. Our results indicated that military hegemonic decline did not seem to have a significant effect on the Latin American effort to seek greater autonomy vis a vis the United States. This is easily understood when one takes into consideration that the decrease in the relative share of world military resources of the United States is mainly due to the increase in military expenditures of Middle East countries. The absolute difference in military capabilities between the United States and Latin America is such that the drop of U.S. relative share of world resources becomes irrelevant.

F. Regarding the dependency subset of variables, these were clearly significant in explaining diplomatic disengagement. However, they were not significant in explaining economic and political disengagement. This is to say that as countries rely less on U.S. resources for their functioning they will tend to be more prone to diversify their treaty activity with countries other than the United States.

When analyzing the components of the dependency subset of variables, it is clear that economic dependency is only significant when explaining political disengaging behavior. It appears to be irrelevant to explain both economic and diplomatic disengagement.

Of all the dependency variables, military dependency seems to be the one that most effectively affects the foreign policy behavior of nations for both the economic and diplomatic behavioral dimensions. This suggests that as long as Latin American countries have strong military ties to the United States economic and diplomatic disengagement will be more difficult to undertake. Results for political disengagement, however, did not seem to be as affected by the military dependency variable. It is important to note, however, the political history of Latin America during the period under study was characterized by the prevalence of military dictatorial rule (largely supported by the U.S.). The literature has already studied the impact of military dependency on the performance of such governments². Before drawing any strong conclusions on the theoretical

² See Muller, Edward N. "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, No.4, Dec. 1985, pp. 445-470; and Stepan, Alfred. "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil" in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds), Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 110-137.

implications of these findings, it would be important to test the effects of the military dependency variable in a period of time where civilian governments are the prevalent ones.

G. The national capabilities subset of variables appeared to have no statistical significance for either dimension of foreign policy behavior once Cuba was excluded from the sample. This indicates that either the national attributes theory needs to be revised or that this foci is not appropriate to explain foreign policy behavior of the Latin American region.

The results suggest that, contrary to what the theory predicts, it is not clear that as countries grow economically they will seek greater autonomy. Quite the opposite the results showed that as their economies grow they tend to rely more on trade with the United States. In the same token, it was not clear that high levels of political stability were associated with disengaging behavior --violating, once again the dictates of the theory. Our findings indicate that, quite opposite than expected, low levels of political stability appeared to be significant when explaining economic and political disengagement.

6.2 DISCUSSION

The patterned Latin American behavior towards greater distancing from the United during the 1948-1983 period has been described. Empirical analysis was performed in an attempt to explain such a phenomenon. A discussion of the relevance that such phenomenon may have for the present and immediate future of the Inter-American relations within a global context is lacking, though. The following paragraphs attempt to cover that point.

The decade of the 1990s started with the breakdown of the balance of power that the world had known since World War II. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union brought as a consequence the appearance of a number of new countries that need to operate in an international system whose rules are completely new to them. Such countries are in need of a strong leadership that can guide them through their transition to a fully independent life. Once the Soviet Union has been removed from the picture it could seem that the right of leadership would naturally lie on the lap of the United States.

The strength in the position of the United States as a world leader, however, is an issue that is not free of questioning. In the early 1990s the United States is going through a serious recession that undermines its ability to

assume full world leadership. In addition to this condition, the relative share of American power in the system appears to have suffered a process of decay since the 1950s. These two elements allow us to speculate that the disappearance of the Soviet Union will not necessarily be followed by a unipolar concentration of power in the hands of the United States.

It seems that the world is approaching a new stage in its international distribution of power which precludes the clustering of secondary nations around one or two major superpowers --defined as such according to their military capabilities. One could argue that current trends in the distribution of world power indicate that clustering will continue to occur but, certainly, on different terms. Once communism has been defeated, the immediate next most important threat to the performance of a capitalist world economy is low international competitiveness. Without a Soviet Union to deter, the new forum of competition for world control is likely to be placed on commercial grounds, and not military ones. One is to expect that the new clustering among nations will take place around common interests on trade. We find that the ASEAN countries are in the midst of a process of economic integration under the leadership of Japan, the European Countries are perfecting their integrative effort that started decades ago, and the United States is leading a continental integrative effort in the Western Hemisphere

named the "Enterprise for the Americas". Initiative introduced by President Bush that is expected to be followed up by the succeeding Democratic Administration, even if not pursued at the same velocity as would be expected of a Republican one.

If the new "way to go" is commercial integration, Latin America becomes the natural primary business partner for the United States. Under this light, to review the relationship that has hold the Americas together becomes particularly relevant. And this piece has intended to contribute some to cover that need.

What have we learned about Latin America that is relevant within this context? We learned that coercive control exercised by the U.S. has failed to prevent Latin American secular distancing from the United States. Furthermore, coercive control does not appear to have worked for anyone. The experiences of both, the Soviet Union and the United States of the post World War II period, have shown that exercising control over their spheres of influence have been extremely costly for both of them. It was an effort that deviated resources of both countries and prevented them from investing internally to secure optimal economic performance and higher levels of productivity and international competitiveness.

We learned, however, that upwardly mobile countries in the world system --this is to say rapidly industrializing countries that become exporters of high value added goods will-- naturally and increasingly, share common commercial interests with the United States. The same is true for countries whose economies are growing rapidly. Such countries will tend, however, to seek greater political autonomy while developing closer commercial ties with the United States.


It is still debatable whether the most important threat to the viability of the United States as a world leader lies on the inadequate levels of international competitiveness. Nevertheless, if one accepts that it is, then the most rational strategy for the United States administration toward Latin America would be to gather as many business partners from the region as possible. It would be rational to encourage the economic growth and the international systemic upward mobility of viable Latin American countries. Make commercial partners of such countries and accept the loss of political control that is involved in such a process.

A P P E N D I X A

GRAPHIC RESULTS FOR LATIN AMERICAN
ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM THE US

GRAPH 1


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US ARGENTINA



GRAPH 2


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US

BOLIVIA




GRAPH 3

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US BRAZIL




GRAPH 4

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US CHILE




GRAPH 5

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US COLOMBIA



GRAPH 6


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US COSTA RICA



GRAPH 7


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US

CUBA




GRAPH 8

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US DOMINICAN REPUBLIC




GRAPH 9

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US ECUADOR




GRAPH 10

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US EL SALVADOR



GRAPH 11


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US GUATEMALA



GRAPH 12


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US

HAITI




GRAPH 13

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US HONDURAS




GRAPH 14

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US MEXICO




GRAPH 15

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US NICARAGUA




GRAPH 16

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US PANAMA



GRAPH 17


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US PARAGUAY



GRAPH 18


ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US

PERU




GRAPH 19

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US URUGUAY



GRAPH 20

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US VENEZUELA




A P P E N D I X B

GRAPHIC RESULTS FOR LATIN AMERICAN
POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM THE US


GRAPH 21

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US ARGENTINA




GRAPH 22

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US BOLIVIA



GRAPH 23


POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US BRAZIL




GRAPH 24

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US


CHILE




GRAPH 25



GRAPH 26




GRAPH 27




GRAPH 28

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US DOMINICAN REPUBLIC




GRAPH 29

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US ECUADOR




GRAPH 30




GRAPH 31

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US GUATEMALA




GRAPH 32

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US HAITI



GRAPH 33


POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US HONDURAS




GRAPH 34

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US

MEXICO




GRAPH 35




GRAPH 36

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US PANAMA




GRAPH 37

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US PARAGUAY




GRAPH 38

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US PERU




GRAPH 39

POLITICAL DISTANCE FROM US URUGUAY



GRAPH 40




A P P E N D I X C

GRAPHIC RESULTS FOR LATIN AMERICAN
DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM THE US


GRAPH 41

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US ARGENTINA




GRAPH 42

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US BOLIVIA




GRAPH 43

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US BRAZIL




GRAPH 44

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US CHILE




GRAPH 45

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US COLOMBIA



GRAPH 46


DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US COSTA RICA



GRAPH 47


DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US

CUBA




GRAPH 48

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US DOMINICAN REPUBLIC




GRAPH 49

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US ECUADOR




GRAPH 50

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US EL SALVADOR




GRAPH 51



GRAPH 52


DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US

HAITI




GRAPH 53

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US HONDURAS




GRAPH 54

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US MEXICO




GRAPH 55

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US NICARAGUA




GRAPH 56

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US PANAMA




GRAPH 57

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US PARAGUAY




GRAPH 58

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US PERU




GRAPH 59

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US URUGUAY



GRAPH 60

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US VENEZUELA




A P P E N D I X D

GRAPHIC RESULTS FOR LATIN AMERICAN
DISTANCING FROM THE US
(Aggregated for all countries)


GRAPH 61

ECONOMIC DISTANCE FROM US

Latin America




GRAPH 62



GRAPH 63

DIPLOMATIC DISTANCE FROM US

LATIN AMERICA (Agregated)



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